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which was hosted at the Faculty of Law of the Uni-
versity of Lisbon in March 16-17, 2012. The compar-
ison concerns the rules on recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments posed by four sets of academic 
principles.
Abstract:  The following comparison was writ-
ten for the first meeting of the International Law As-
sociation’s newly established (2010) Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Private International Law 
(Chair: Professor Toshiyuki Kono, Kyushu University; 
Co-Rapporteurs: Professors Pedro de Miguel Asensio, 
Madrid Complutense University, and Axel Metzger, 
Hannover University) (hereinafter: ILA Committee), 
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A. Introduction
1 The following pages compare the rules on recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments posed by four 
sets of academic principles, namely the ALI Prin-
ciples Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes, adopted on 
14 May 2007 (will be referred to as the ALI Princi-
ples); the “Principles for Conflict of Laws in Intellec-
tual Property, prepared by the European Max Planck 
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Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property 
(CLIP),”  published on 31 August 2011 (will be re-
ferred to as the CLIP Principles); the “Transparency 
of Japanese Law Project, Transparency Proposal on 
Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual Property” 
finalized in 2009 (will be referred to as the Trans-
parency Proposal); the “Principles of Private Inter-
national Law on Intellectual Property Rights, Joint 
Proposal Drafted by Members of the Private Inter-
national Law Association of Korea and Japan (Joint 
University Global COE Project),” of 14 October 2010 
(will be referred to as the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal). As the comparison demonstrates, 
in practice, all four sets of Principles lead to similar 
results allowing for recognition and enforcement of 
judgments defined in a broad and flexible way inclu-
sive of non-final judgments, as well as of provisional 
measures. The similarity among the principles at 
stake is grounded on the great need, particularly in 
connection with IPRs, for the effective protection of 
a rights holder from infringement; and is a natural 
consequence of the favor shown towards the con-
solidation of claims provided for by all four sets of 
principles in question.
B. Scope of Application 
1. Differences 
2 Pursuant to Section 401.1, the ALI Principles’ provi-
sions on recognition and enforcement apply only to 
foreign judgments rendered by courts that applied 
the Principles. By contrast, if the rendering court did 
not apply the Principles, then the enforcement court 
should determine whether to recognize or enforce 
the judgment pursuant to its domestic rules on rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.1 All 
of the other sets of Principles here analyzed, how-
ever, provide that their provisions on recognition 
and enforcement apply to foreign judgments ren-
dered by any courts, whether they applied the set of 
principles at stake or not. Additionally, reciprocity is 
not a precondition for recognition and enforcement 
under the ALI Principles, CLIP Principles and Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal, whereas it is a pre-
condition according to the Transparency Proposal 
(Article 402 (vi)).2 The Preliminary Draft Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters of 30 October 1999 and then of 
February 2001 (hereinafter, Hague Judgment Con-
vention or Hague Draft Convention) does have an 
element of reciprocity, being a draft for an interna-
tional convention, as is outlined below in paragraph 
B.IV. Finally, only the CLIP Principles explicitly pose 
the favor recognitionis principle.3
2. Rationale 
3 The ALI Principles limit the application of its reco-
gnition and enforcement rules to judgments that 
were rendered according to the ALI Principles (§ 
401). Thus, according to the comments to this pro-
vision it “creates [the] condition[…] on enforcement 
and Recognition […] that the dispute was declared 
by the rendering court as within the scope of the 
Principles.”4 “If the rendering court did not apply 
the ALI Principles, the enforcement court shall de-
termine whether to recognize or enforce the judg-
ment pursuant to its domestic rules on recognition 
and enforcement (subsection (l)(b)).”5
4 By contrast, the recognition and enforcement rules 
of the CLIP Principles, the Transparency Proposal, 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal are not 
limited to judgments that applied their respective 
rules. Not limiting the applicability of the proposal 
to “situations in which the rendering court has ap-
plied the Principles seems to be more flexible than 
the one adopted under §401(1) ALI Principles. This 
flexibility may be helpful for designing a model not 
only for international or treaty legislators but also 
for national legislators when drafting their own na-
tional systems to be applied to decisions adopted in 
any country in the world.”6 
5 Additionally, the CLIP Principles and the Joint Ko-
rean and Japanese Proposal do not require re-
ciprocity as a precondition for recognition and en-
forcement. Thus, a judgment otherwise entitled to 
recognition will not be denied recognition simply 
because the rendering country might not recog-
nize the judgment of the country where recogni-
tion is sought if the circumstances were reversed. 
The approach of the CLIP Principles “is based on the 
idea that public or state interests are affected only 
indirectly by the recognition of judgments that re-
solve civil controversies between private parties.”7 
As such, “[t]he protection of public interests does 
not justify recourse to reciprocity, since other alter-
natives more respectful of the rights of the private 
parties involved and the policy goals behind recog-
nition provide the necessary safeguards, especially 
the use of public policy as a ground for non-recog-
nition.”8 In contrast, reciprocity is a precondition 
for recognition and enforcement under the Trans-
parency Proposal (Article 402 (vi)). With respect to 
this Proposal the presence of the reciprocity require-
ment is influenced by the corresponding rule in the 
Japanese system, namely Article 118 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. However, this rule has been critici-
sed, both in the context of the Japanese system and 
in the Transparency Proposal, as will be recalled in 
the Discussion section below. Notwithstanding this 
criticism, the Transparency Proposal keeps the re-
ciprocity requirement for the following reason, well 
expressed by the commentary’s exact wording: “due 
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to considerable differences of legal policies on IP 
rights and unfair competition, there are many va-
rieties concerning the scope, degree and method of 
the protection of rights. Under these circumstances, 
it is still unclear if for only Japan to abandon the re-
ciprocity requirement would create more protection 
of IP rights or fair competition. Thus, the Transpa-
rency Proposal still maintains the reciprocity requi-
rement to recognize and enforce foreign judgments 
relating to IP rights or unfair competition. However, 
the standards for determining the reciprocity should 
be relaxed as explained below. (2) Standards for Re-
ciprocity. The requirement of reciprocity would be 
satisfied, if, in the rendering court, a Japanese judg-
ment of the same kind relating to IP or unfair com-
petition would be recognized or enforced under sub-
stantially the same conditions as those prescribed in 
the Transparency Proposal. This is based on acade-
mic opinions and judgments so far, which have ge-
nerously recognized the existence of reciprocity.”9
6  With regard to reciprocity, the ALI provisions on re-
cognition and enforcement are drafted as an instru-
ment to be applied only to judgments that followed 
the principles. Hence there is no need for recipro-
city as a condition for recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.10
3. International Context
7 Notwithstanding the fact that the existing and ne-
gotiated universal international instruments on IP, 
especially the ones concluded and negotiated in the 
past two decades among which the TRIPs agree-
ment and the ACTA, strongly emphasise the need 
to effectively enforce intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), and albeit enforcement of IPRs across na-
tional borders is crucial for their effective protec-
tion,11 those international instruments focus their 
emphasis on purely domestic issues,12 while at the 
same time “ignore” transnational disputes,13 fail to 
address problems of cross-border enforcement of 
IPRs through civil litigations, and do not deal with 
cross-border recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments. Yet, international conventions on recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments concerning civil 
and commercial matters in general can have an im-
pact on IPRs judgments. Among those conventions 
at the regional level in the EU/EFTA frame worth re-
membering are the 1968 Brussels Convention, now 
Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001), and the 
Lugano Convention (hereinafter Brussels system), 
which achieved significant uniformity. Yet, the Brus-
sels system’s recognition and enforcement rules ap-
ply only to judgments given by a court of another 
Member State, even though the recasting of this Reg-
ulation will also address third States’ judgments,14 
mainly in line with the European Group of Private 
International Law Proposed Amendment of Regula-
tion 44/2001 in Order to Apply it to External Situa-
tions (Bergen, 21 September 2008, Padua 20 Septem-
ber 2009, Copenhagen, 19 September 2010),15 Thus, 
for the time being the Brussels system is subject to 
reciprocity. Furthermore, conventions in this field 
aim at creating a special regime that favors recog-
nition of judgments. 
8 In contrast, national rules do not pose reciprocity as 
a precondition for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. See, for instance, the PIL Swiss 
law as well as the Italian law on the matter. Also, the 
majority of U.S. courts do not impose a reciprocity 
requirement for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments.16 This approach is reflected 
in U.S. legislation (e.g., the Uniform Foreign Mon-
ey-Judgments Recognition Act) as well as in Amer-
ican treatises (e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law).17 While some national legal systems 
do include a reciprocity requirement, such as in 
Spain and Japan, it typically does not play a signifi-
cant role in practice and the generally held view is 
that the requirement should be abolished.18 
4. Discussion
9 The extension of the provisions on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments of the CLIP Prin-
ciples, the Transparency Proposal and the Joint Ko-
rean and Japanese Proposal to situations in which 
the rendering court has not applied the Principles 
corresponds to their aim to be model rules. In fact, 
“contrary to international conventions, model rules 
made by national or private bodies in the area of rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments are not ex-
pected to be applied as such by courts in typical sit-
uations. Indeed, Part 4 of the CLIP Principles may 
in practice mainly be useful as a reference to inter-
pret or supplement international and domestic law 
and as a model for national and international legisla-
tors, in line with the possible uses of the CLIP Princi-
ples as stated in the Preamble. Therefore, the provi-
sions of Part 4 of the CLIP Principles are not drafted 
to be applicable only to situations in which the ren-
dering court has applied the Principles.”19 In con-
trast, notwithstanding the fact that this aim is also 
proper to the rules of the ALI Principles, their lim-
ited application to judgments rendered by courts of 
countries adopting the Principles seems to be sub-
ject to criticism.
10 Reciprocity should not be a precondition for recog-
nition and enforcement, as it is under the Transpar-
ency Proposal, since other alternatives already pro-
vide the necessary safeguards for the protection of 
public interests involved, especially the use of pub-
lic policy as a ground for non-recognition.20 Also, the 
questionable aspects of reciprocity are highlighted 
by the commentary on the Transparency Proposal 
according to which the requirement of reciprocity 
should be deleted from Article 118 of the Code of 
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Civil Procedure21 as well as from the Transparency 
Proposal,22 since first, it is “theoretically problematic 
that the lack of efforts of the concerned government 
to establish reciprocity would bring about burdens 
on private persons as users of the system of the rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.” 23 
Second, “it takes too much time and costs to gather 
and translate foreign legal materials for examining 
the requirement of reciprocity.”24 Third, only a few 
countries still pose the reciprocity requirement.25 In 
this context the reason given by the Transparency 
Commentary to include the reciprocity requirement, 
indicated in paragraph B.II. on rationales, does not 
seem so convincing as the same commentary rec-
ognizes and states that “keeping this requirement 
would certainly need careful consideration” 26 and 
also that in any case “the standards for determin-
ing the reciprocity should be relaxed” as explained 
27 in paragraph B.II. on rationales. 
11 Although the 2001 Hague Draft Convention does not 
explicitly limit the scope of the Convention to judg-
ments adopted by contracting States, the fact that 
it was a draft for an international convention makes 
it clear that its provisions would only apply to de-
cisions adopted by the courts of other contracting 
States. Therefore the Convention technically sup-
ports the reciprocity requirement embodied in the 
Transparency Proposal, but it is in an entirely dif-
ferent context, namely that of an international con-
vention where some degree of reciprocity is implicit.
12 Finally, Art. 4:103 of the CLIP Principles’ favor recog-
nitionis principle is to be welcomed.
C. Definition of judgment and 
provisional measures
I. Differences 
13 According to Professor de Miguel Asensio, the term 
judgment in the CLIP Principles is to be understood 
in a very broad way, as covering “appealable judg-
ments, provisionally enforceable orders […] judg-
ments rendered in default of appearance […] Orders 
for the payment of money, orders for the transfer 
and delivery of property, orders regulating the con-
duct of the parties, and orders declaring the rights 
and liabilities of the parties, including negative dec-
larations such as declarations on non-infringement 
of IP rights […], monetary and non monetary judg-
ments.”28 By contrast, interlocutory decisions of a 
procedural nature are not covered.  Particularly, 
“money judgments are usually the result of the au-
thority granted to the courts to order the infringer to 
pay damages to the right holder. Typical non-money 
judgments include court orders for a party to desist 
from an infringement as well as “money penalties, 
such as coercive fines, astreintes, substituted perfor-
mance of not strictly personal acts, coercive deten-
tion, and, in the common law world, the institution 
of contempt of court.”29 Non-money judgments ex-
ist also in the form of injunctions stopping the mar-
keting or production of a good and the the use of 
protected subject matter; orders for delivery of in-
fringing items; and other specific performance or-
ders. Furthermore, declaratory judgments and even 
negative declarations can also be included in the no-
tion of non-money judgments.30 
14 Article 401.1 of the Transparency Proposal leads to 
the same result as the CLIP Principles,31 as clarified 
by the commentary according to which this rule “ba-
sically accepts the existing interpretation of Japa-
nese law,” including “(a) a money or a non-money 
judgment, (b) a judgment ordering affirmative relief, 
or a declaratory judgment, (c) a judgment given af-
ter contesting proceedings or a judgment given in 
default of the appearance of the defendant, and (d) a 
judgment given in a summary procedure, etc., what-
ever the judgment might be called.”32 With respect to 
the recognition and enforcement of injunctions see 
infra the parts related to the effects of judgments, 
to the public policy and to the recognition and en-
forcement procedures.    
15 Finally, with respect to the Transparency Proposal 
the literature makes it clear that “a ‘foreign court’ 
means the authority of a foreign country that ex-
ercised civil jurisdiction, whatever name is given 
to that authority”33 and therefore, includes admin-
istrative agencies, such as a national patent office. 
The same result is reachable under the other sets 
of principles, since for instance the notion of judg-
ments in the CLIP Principles is intended as “includ-
ing writs of execution and the determination of costs 
or expenses by an officer of the court, which in some 
countries are decisions of the registrar.”34
16 There are minor differences between the sets of 
principles, notably: the Transparency Proposal is 
the only proposal analyzed here that gives no spe-
cial treatment to default judgments, and further-
more, of the four proposals, only the CLIP Principles 
explicitly specify that the term “judgment” also en-
compasses settlements to which a court has given its 
authority. In addition, unlike the Transparency Pro-
posal, which defines provisional measures, the CLIP 
Principles, the ALI Principles and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal do not explicitly character-
ize the notion of provisional measures in the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments, but refer to 
their respective rules on international jurisdiction 
with regard to those measures. 
17 Notwithstanding those minor differences, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that “the basic meaning of ‘judg-
ment’ of Art. 401.1 of the Transparency Proposal is to 
the same effect as in the ALI Principles § 101.2 and in 
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the CLIP Principles.”35 The same can be said with re-
gards to the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal. The 
broad idea of “judgment” encompassed in all sets 
of principles is supported by the 2001 Hague Judg-
ment Convention, in Article 23, as is outlined in par-
agraph C.IV. below. The Convention is also in agree-
ment with the majority of the Principles in having 
special rules for default judgments.
18  In respect of default judgments, see infra paragraph 
H., which discusses them in the context of verifica-
tion of jurisdiction, paragraph J., which discusses 
them in relation to the limitation on fact-finding, 
and paragraph O., which discusses the protection of 
the defendant during the proceedings, and the im-
plications of default judgments in that regard.
II. Rationale 
19 The similar results reached by the four sets of prin-
ciples addressed with regard to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, defined in a broad and 
flexible way,36 as well as to provisional measures, are 
grounded on the great need, particularly in connec-
tion with IP, for the effective protection of a rights 
holder from an infringement.37  
20 With respect to the ALI Principles, the CLIP Princi-
ples and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal con-
ferring a special treatment to default judgments, the 
rationale is to protect the interests of the defend-
ant and that “these additional protections are nec-
essary in light of the expanded bases of personal ju-
risdiction that the Principles establish, and because 
of the absence of a supranational court competent 
to ensure that the Principles’ norms are properly 
applied.”38 According to the Joint Korean and Jap-
anese Proposal, “an expedient and effective rem-
edy for the winning party’s rights takes priority if 
the defendant appears, but Section 402 protects the 
defendant who failed to appear in court. Review of 
the jurisdiction over the default judgment shall be 
reviewed in a more restrained manner - this idea is 
associated with the issue of facts found by the ren-
dering court […], and has been written into more and 
more international conventions.”39 In contrast, the 
Transparency Proposal protects more the plaintiffs’ 
interests; albeit the interests of the defendants are 
also safeguarded by adopting the rules related to the 
general requirements of recognizing and enforcing 
a foreign judgment40.
21  Paragraph H.II further considers default judgments 
in the context of verification of jurisdiction, includ-
ing the conclusion that imposing additional controls 
on the verification of jurisdiction for default judg-
ments is inappropriate.
III. International Context
22 Art. 32 of the Brussels I Regulation adopts a broad 
definition of judgments, which states that “for the 
purposes of this Regulation, ‘judgment’ means any 
judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member 
State, whatever the judgment may be called, includ-
ing a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as 
well as the determination of costs or expenses by an 
officer of the court.” The Lugano Convention deter-
mines “judgment” to mean “all decisions given by 
a court or tribunal, whatever they may be called.” 
including “orders on costs or expenses made by an 
officer of the court” as outlined in Professor Pocar’s 
Explanatory Report.41 This report also makes it clear 
that provisional and protective measures fall within 
the meaning of “judgments,” provided that both par-
ties were given a chance to be heard in the State of 
origin. With regard to non-monetary judgments, al-
though not specifically in the IP field, the ECJ in the 
Realchemie case clarified that the recognition and en-
forcement rules of the Brussels system also apply to 
the non-monetary judgments such as “a decision of 
a court or tribunal that contains an order to pay a 
fine in order to ensure compliance with a judgment 
given in a civil and commercial matter.”42 This de-
cision is in line with other recent ECJ decisions with 
respect to the scope of non-monetary injunctions 
related to EU IPRs.43 Those decisions “mark an im-
portant passage in the cross border enforcement of 
IPRs, explicitly pronouncing themselves in favour of 
the circulation of injunctive mechanisms which are 
so important in this field.”44 With regard to the pro-
cedures to enforce an injunction in the Brussels sys-
tem see paragraph R. related to the recognition and 
enforcement procedures. Finally, in the EU Brussels 
system “the term ‘court’ means an authority which 
regularly exercises judicial functions and is entitled 
to give a judgment as regards legal relationship un-
der private law.”45 Thus, a foreign judgment to be 
recognised may also be rendered by an administra-
tive authority or a criminal one. 
23 At the national level non-monetary judgments posed 
by the different systems can highly vary, as empha-
sised in paragraph C, related to the definition of 
judgment.46 In the past, certain common law sys-
tems did not admit the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign non-monetary judgments, but legislation 
and practice has recently overcome this trend.47 
24 The majority of the four sets of principles find spe-
cial treatment for default judgments, which is also 
sometimes established at the national level, includ-
ing in Japan.48
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IV. Discussion
25 The broad approach adopted by the four sets of Prin-
ciples is to be welcomed, especially in light of the 
need for effective enforcement of IPRs.
26 The 2001 Hague Judgment Convention defines “judg-
ment” in Article 23(a) as “any decision given by a 
court, whatever it may be called, including a decree 
or order, as well as the determination of costs or ex-
penses by an officer of the court, provided that it re-
lates to a decision which may be recognised or en-
forced under the Convention.” Article 23(b) excludes 
provisional and protective measures from the scope 
of “judgment.” The same broad definition of judg-
ments is to be found in Art. 4 of the 2005 Hague Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements. Therefore 
the Hague Draft Convention supports the broad ap-
proach adopted by all of the Principles.
27 As for the issue of the establishment of special rules 
related to the enforcement of default judgments, the 
approach of the Transparency Proposal, unlike that 
of the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal and the 2001 Hague 
Judgment Convention, is grounded in the fact that 
the defendants’ interests are already well-protected 
by the general requirements for recognising and en-
forcing a foreign judgment.49
28 For further discussion on default judgments, see par-
agraph H.IV., which discusses them in the context of 
verification of jurisdiction, and reaches the conclu-
sion that imposing additional controls on the verifi-
cation of jurisdiction for default judgments is inap-
propriate, and paragraph J.IV., which discusses them 
in the context of finding facts. Furthermore, para-
graph O.IV. discusses default judgments in the con-
text of service to the defendant, and when non-ser-
vice will be grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement.
D. Finality of judgments 
I. Differences 
29 In practice, all four sets of Principles lead to simi-
lar results allowing for the recognition and enforce-
ment of non-final judgments as well as of provisional 
measures. Yet, the ALI Principles adopt the term “fi-
nal” to designate a judgment that indeed can also be 
of a non-final nature, in conformity with the U.S. in-
ternal system.50 Furthermore, the Transparency Pro-
posal’s relevant rule (Article 403.2) acknowledges 
the possibility of making enforcement of non-final 
judgments conditional on the provision of security 
by the party seeking enforcement. This possibility is 
understood as compatible with the CLIP Principles 
as well.51 The Article 23A of the 2001 Hague Judg-
ment Convention also supports the recognition and 
enforcement of non-final judgments, as is outlined 
in paragraph D.IV.
II. Rationale 
30 The similar results reached by the four sets of 
principles addressed with regard to the allowance 
of the recognition and enforcement of non-final 
judgments, as well as of provisional measures, are 
grounded on the great need, particularly in connec-
tion with IP, for the timely and effective protection 
of a rights holder from an infringement.  As such, 
provisional measures and non-final judgments “may 
practically speaking bring the dispute to an end.”52 
Thus, all the sets of Principles “on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments take on more sig-
nificance upon the creditor’s rights and interests, 
intended to protect those rights and interests effi-
ciently and effectively at an international level to 
as great an extent possible. It’s safe to say the most 
recent treaties related to this issue also value most 
highly the rights and interests of the creditor.”53 The 
possibility of requiring the party seeking enforce-
ment to provide securities is understood as a remedy 
to avoid precluding recognition and enforcement of 
the foreign judgment, therefore granting the effec-
tive enforcement of IPRs.54 
31 The ALI Principles’ notion of final judgments for 
judgments that are still subject to appeal derives 
from the U.S. legal notion as will be discussed at par-
agraph E.III.
III. International Context
32 The recognition and enforcement of non-final judg-
ments as well as of provisional measures is allowed 
by the EU Brussels System, as will be recalled in par-
agraph E.III., as well as by the most recent national 
laws adopted on that point.55 From a comparative 
perspective, various States follow the view that na-
tional non-final decisions can be enforced in their 
legal system56 and therefore are more favorable to 
the possibility of enforcing foreign non-final deci-
sions whenever they are recognised as enforceable 
by the rendering court’s system.
33 Yet, some national rules, including Italy57 and Ja-
pan,58 still only allow recognition and enforcement 
of final judgments.. In particular, while Italy explic-
itly requires a foreign judgment to have become res 
judicata in order for it to be recognised and enforced 
in Italy, as will be discussed in paragraph E.III., Japan 
adopts the wording “final and binding” (Art. 118 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 24(3) of the Civil Ex-
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ecution Act). The literature clarifies that “it is gener-
ally understood that a judgment becomes final and 
binding at the point in time when it is no longer sub-
ject to ordinary forms of review under the law of the 
rendering country.”59
34 In the EU under the current Brussels system it is 
generally accepted that provisional measures can be 
recognized abroad, but only if a court that is compe-
tent over the merit grants them. In contrast, when 
a different court, namely the one of the territorial 
State, grants them, they cannot be recognized. This 
approach is codified by the EU Commission proposal 
for the recasting of the Brussels I Regulation since 
under the Brussels Regulation Article 2(a) of the 
Commission Proposal restricts cross-border enforce-
ment to those provisional measures that have been 
“ordered by a court which by virtue of this Regula-
tion has jurisdiction as to the substance of the mat-
ter” (Recital 25 second sentence). In contrast, pro-
visional measures adopted by other courts “should 
be confined to the territory of that Member State” 
(Recital 25 third sentence)60.
35 In the U.S. the notion of final judgments is also 
adopted with respect to judgments that are still 
subject to appeal, as will be highlighted in the par-
agraph E.III.
IV. Discussion
36 The approach adopted by the four sets of Princi-
ples is to be welcomed, especially in light of the 
need for effective and timely enforcement of IPRs. 
This approach is also supported by the 2001 Hague 
Judgment Convention, which states that non-final 
judgments as well as provisional measures shall be 
recognised. Yet, the ALI Principles’ adoption of the 
term “final” to characterize a judgment that can also 
be non-final could potentially cause confusion. 
E. Effects of judgments
I. Differences 
37 All four sets of Principles avoid the adoption of the 
term res judicata. However, the ALI Principles and the 
CLIP Principles explicitly clarify that the effects at-
tributed to a foreign judgment throughout the rec-
ognition and enforcement procedures should be no 
greater than the effects of the judgment in the ren-
dering State under the doctrine of extension of ef-
fects.61 So the effects of a foreign judgment should be 
determined by the lex originis. More specifically, this 
law determines when the judgment is enforceable. 
38 Yet, several derogations are established. First, the 
CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles make it clear 
that enforcement of foreign judgments takes place 
according to the lex fori, and therefore the requested 
state can limit the enforcement of foreign judgments 
or injunctions if they are contrary to its public pol-
icy, or if they establish remedies that are unknown 
in the forum State’s legal system. Second, preclu-
sive effects that are against the right to a fair trial 
should also be denied recognition. Third, the effects 
of injunctions or judgments should be limited es-
pecially with regard to the Internet context and in 
light of the need to respect the territorial nature 
of IPRs; this limitation derives from specific rules 
(CLIP Principles on the scope of injunctions) or from 
the rules on partial recognition and enforcement of 
judgments (severability). Fourth a specific limitation 
relates to foreign judgments declaring the invalidity 
of IP rights. A final limitation relates to the provi-
sion of suitable compensation in cases where a com-
pulsory license is granted (Art.404(3) of the Trans-
parency Proposal).
39  Therefore the extension of effects doctrine is com-
bined with the equalization of effects doctrine un-
der which the effects of a foreign judgment is equiv-
alent to a similar judgment of the requested court. 
Finally the Kumulationstheorie applies, under which 
“the extension of effects of the legal system of ori-
gin normally applies only to the extent that they are 
compatible with the legal system of the requested 
state.”62 
40 The 2001 Hague Judgment Convention, supports this 
approach, with the alternatives provided for in Ar-
ticle 25 all grounded in the doctrine of extension of 
effects, as is outlined below at paragraph E.IV.
41 By contrast, the adoption of the doctrine of equal-
ization of effects is not made explicitly clear in ei-
ther the Transparency Proposal or the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal. However, the commentary to 
the Transparency Proposal highlights that a non-fi-
nal judgment can be enforced only if it is enforce-
able in the rendering court,63 thus making it clear 
that the lex originis determines the ability of the re-
quested state recognizing the effect of a judgment, 
as well. The same result seems to be reachable un-
der the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal. Finally, 
Article 404(3) of the Transparency Proposal allows 
for courts to decline the enforcement of a foreign 
injunction in Japan under circumstances in which 
the defendant is authorised by the Government of 
Japan to use the intellectual property right in ques-
tion without the authorization of the right holder. 
This provision explicitly provides that refusal to en-
force an injunction is subject to monetary compen-
sation to the rights holder.  
42 None of the four sets of principles have adopted a 
provision on the evidential use of foreign judgments. 
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43 With respect to the recognition and enforcement of 
injunctions, see also the paragraphs related to the 
public policy (M.), recognition and enforcement pro-
cedures (R.) and severability (G.).  
II. Rationale 
44 All sets of principles avoid the adoption of the term 
res judicata since “it has different meanings in diffe-
rent places. Instead, [the ALI Principles] […] utilize 
the terms enforcement, recognition, and preclusive 
effect. These terms should be understood to cover 
the gamut of consequences that a judgment may 
have.”64 The CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles 
clarify that the lex originis determines the effect of 
a foreign judgment to be recognised by the reques-
ted court, in particular whether and when the judg-
ment is enforceable. This is so because “applying 
the rendering court’s law on the upper limit of the 
preclusive effect of the judgment is necessary to al-
low the parties to understand the stakes of the liti-
gation at the time when they are making litigation 
decisions. Moreover, if another jurisdiction applies 
preclusion that would be denied by the rendering 
court, the parties could inadvertently lose claims or 
arguments. It could be argued that the enforcement 
court should not give an effect lesser than that of the 
rendering court because that would also undermine 
the finality of the decision.” 65 
45 Yet, certain derogations are established. First, the 
CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles make clear 
that enforcement of foreign judgments takes place 
according to the lex fori, and therefore “legal and pro-
cedural constraints in the requested state may affect 
the available remedies, especially to the extent that 
enforcement of injunctions is at stake.”66 Second, ac-
cording to Professor De Miguel, under the CLIP Prin-
ciples the general rule that foreign judgments should 
be given the same effect as what the rendering coun-
try provides should be mitigated in the following 
case: “to the extent that the country of recognition 
has broader rules on preclusion than the country of 
origin (for instance, because only under the law of 
the country where recognition is sought does such 
a judgment preclude re-litigation as to matters ac-
tually not litigated) restraint should be exercised 
by the recognizing court.”67 So, for instance Profes-
sor De Miguel recalls recent case law where “before 
applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to judg-
ments rendered in countries where such concepts 
are unknown, a U.S. court must satisfy itself that the 
party to be bound had fair opportunity and incentive 
to litigate in the foreign court the issue sought to be 
precluded from relitigation in the U.S.” 68 Third, with 
regard to the effects of injunctions, the CLIP Princi-
ples specifically deal with the issue of the interpre-
tation of the scope of injunctions by the court of en-
forcement, namely at Article 4:102(3), allowing the 
requested court to limit the effects of foreign injun-
ctions to be recognised in exceptional cases related 
to the Internet context. In fact, “the displaying, offe-
ring for sale, or download of a product protected by 
IP might be legal in some countries of reception but 
not in others. Under such circumstances, a court’s 
injunction must only encompass the illicit part of 
the behaviour, and the infringer must be allowed to 
continue his legal Internet activities or be able to ad-
apt his Internet presence without the right holder 
having the possibility of preventing him from doing 
so on the basis of the original judgment.”69 The ALI 
Principles’ Section 412(1)(b) reaches the same result, 
which provides that if the court limits the effects of 
an injunction it must award monetary relief. Indeed, 
the rationale underlying the CLIP Principles’ rules on 
the issue of the interpretation of the scope of injun-
ctions by the court of enforcement is a need to limit 
the scope of those injunctions especially in ubiqui-
tous infringements cases.70 Yet, the corresponding 
rules in the ALI Principles are not explicitly justified 
on that rationale, but rather on the basis of safegu-
arding strong public policies of the country of en-
forcement. In any case the limitation of effects of in-
junctions, similar to the same limitation of effects of 
judgments, can be derived from the rules on partial 
recognition and enforcement of judgments (severa-
bility). With respect to the recognition and enforce-
ment of injunctions see also the paragraphs related 
to the public policy (M.), to the recognition and en-
forcement procedures (R.) and to severability (G.).  
46 The lack of provisions on the evidentiary use of fo-
reign judgments in the four sets of Principles is ba-
sed on the fact that this matter falls within the law 
of evidence and is to be determined in accordance 
with the law of the forum.71 
III. International Context
47 The Brussels system does not make any reference 
to the term res judicata. This is because res judicata is 
not a requirement for recognition under the Conven-
tion. Furthermore, the Pocar Report on the Lugano 
Convention explains that Article 38 of the Conven-
tion provides for foreign judgments to be declared 
enforceable only when they are already enforce-
able in their State of origin.72 So, the Brussels sys-
tem adopts the doctrine of effects together with the 
Kumulationstheorie.73 
48 The avoidance of the reference to the term res judi-
cata is based also on the fact that this term is subject 
to significant variation across jurisdictions. Particu-
larly, common law countries adopt the notions of is-
sue preclusion and collateral estoppel, which are not 
known to civil law systems74 and are much broader 
than the corresponding notion of res judicata.75 In 
fact, “in the U.S., issue preclusion, also known as col-
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lateral estoppel, prevents a party and its privies from 
re-litigating questions of fact or law which were ac-
tually litigated and determined in a prior suit, even 
if the later suit involves a different claim or cause 
of action.”76 In contrast, in civil law systems such as 
the European and South American ones, “the pre-
clusive effect of a judgment is limited to a later suit 
that is identical with the previous judgment in ob-
ject, cause, and parties. In addition, the effects are 
restricted to the dispositive part of the judgment and 
do not extend to the grounds.”77 Furthermore, “[i]
n common law countries res judicata typically arises 
when the judgment on the merits cannot be recon-
sidered by the same court in ordinary proceedings, 
even though the decision may be subject to appeal. 
Hence, the term final, even as a condition for rec-
ognition and enforcement, is understood in a very 
flexible way. By contrast, in some civil law coun-
tries a judgment may only be considered final and 
produce the preclusive or binding effect of res judi-
cata (materielle Rechtskraftwirkung) when it is no 
longer subject to ordinary forms of review (formelle 
Rechtskraft).”78 
49  To demonstrate the broad notion of the issue of pre-
clusion it is significant to refer to the IPRs field. For 
a discussion on the approach taken by the U.S., see 
infra at paragraph I. Among the civil law countries, 
Italy adopts the notion of res judicata, dictating that 
the foreign judgment can be recognized only when it 
became res judicata “according to the law of the coun-
try where it was rendered.”79  This law will then de-
termine also the preclusive effects to be recognized 
for the judgment to become res judicata. 
50 Finally, in the majority of national legal systems, for-
eign judgments may be partly recognized and en-
forced.80  The Hague Draft Convention and, at the 
EU level, Art.48 of the Brussels I Regulation and of 
the Lugano Convention confirm this approach at 
the international level. It has also been academi-
cally supported.81 
IV. Discussion
51 The avoidance of the term res judicata by all four sets 
of principles should be applauded, particularly in 
light of the differences among the common law and 
the civil law legal systems on this issue. Also to be 
welcomed is the adoption of the Kumulationstheorie 
by all sets of principles involved. In addition, all sets 
of principles follow the same grounds to limit the 
effects of foreign judgments even though they may 
adopt different rules to reach this result. So, for in-
stance a rule such as the one of the CLIP Principles 
on the issue of the interpretation of the scope of in-
junctions by the court of enforcement dealt with by 
Article 4:102(3) is to be welcomed as a way to tem-
per the necessarily broad international jurisdiction 
related to ubiquitous infringement cases. The same 
limitation of effects can be derived, however, from 
the rules on severability. With respect to the recog-
nition and enforcement of injunctions issues, see 
also the paragraphs related to the public policy (M.), 
to the recognition and enforcement procedures (R.) 
and to severability (G.).  Among the other reasons 
for the limitation of effects are the public policy ex-
ception, the right to a fair trial, the reason related to 
the invalidity of IP rights, and the reason concern-
ing suitable compensation in cases where a compul-
sory license is granted. 
52 The 2001 Hague Judgment Convention supports the 
approach taken by the ALI Principles and the CLIP 
Principles, as it is outlined by its Report, according 
to which common law and civil law systems see the 
issue of when a judgment becomes res judicata differ-
ently.82 For example, England and the United States 
will consider a decision res judicata whenever the 
same court cannot reconsider the issue, but many 
civil law systems consider that a decision only be-
comes res judicata when the decision has exhausted 
all forms of ordinary review.  The Hague Draft Con-
vention therefore states ,“1. A judgment based on a 
ground of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, 
or which is consistent with any such ground, shall be 
recognised or enforced under this Chapter. 2. [In or-
der to be recognised, a judgment referred to in par-
agraph 1 must have the effect of res judicata in the 
State of origin.] or [A judgment referred to in para-
graph 1 shall be recognised from the time, and for as 
long as, it produces its effects in the State of origin.] 
3. [In order to be enforceable, a judgment referred 
to in paragraph 1 must be enforceable in the State 
of origin.] or [A judgment referred to in the preced-
ing paragraphs shall be enforceable from the time, 
and for as long as, it is enforceable in the State of 
origin].” Each of those alternatives is grounded on 
the doctrine of the extension of effects (Wirkungsers-
treckung), together with the Kumulationstheorie.83 The 
same result is reachable on the basis of the Trans-
parency and Joint Korean and Japanese Proposals. 
F. Postponing the recognition 
or enforcement of foreign 
non-final judgments
I.  Differences 
53 The relevant rules of the CLIP Principles and Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal grant judicial discre-
tion to a court to stay recognition and enforcement 
of foreign non-final judgments when they are sub-
ject to review in the rendering State, each using the 
word “may” in the relevant provisions. The 2001 
Hague Judgment Convention uses the same discre-
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tionary terminology in Article 25(4), as is discussed 
further in paragraph F.IV. The ALI Principles go 
even further, mandating that courts “should” stay 
the proceeding pending appeal.  The Comments to 
the ALI Principles provide that “§ 401(2) instructs a 
court to delay both recognition and enforcement un-
til the time for reviewing the decision is over.”84 The 
Transparency Proposal also goes even further in that 
even though it adopts the word “may” it allows the 
requested court to stay the proceeding “when the 
court deems it necessary to do so,” and therefore not 
only when the non-final judgment is being appealed. 
II. Rationale 
54 While the CLIP Principles, the Transparency Pro-
posal and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
adopt the wording “may” and therefore grant courts 
judicial discretion to stay recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign non-final judgments when they are 
the subject of reviews in the rendering State, the 
ALI Principles use the term “should” and clarify in 
the comments that “§ 401(2) instructs a court to de-
lay both recognition and enforcement until the time 
for reviewing the decision is over.” Professor Des-
semontet explains the reason behind this rule by 
referring to the Hilmarton case ,which “illustrates 
the grave risk of allowing enforcement of arbitral 
awards that are not yet final and binding. This risk 
also exists with respect to enforcement of foreign 
judgments in intellectual property cases.”85 Re-
gardless of whether staying a proceeding is discre-
tionary or mandatory, the corresponding rules in 
each of the Principles are based on the fact that the 
contrasting approach, which would entitle a judg-
ment to enforcement as soon as it was entered ir-
respective of whether an appeal is pending, would 
be risky in “a multijurisdictional system such as the 
one contemplated here.”86 In fact, “since a not ‘final 
and binding’ judgment involves difficulties in the 
possible rehabilitation, a flexible consideration of 
the circumstances of each case is extremely neces-
sary. Therefore, like provisional measures, it is nec-
essary to grant the court discretion to flexibly deal 
with a case, and thus a court may stay proceedings 
in order to determine whether or not enforcement 
should be granted (mutatis mutandis application of 
Art. 403(3) by Art. 403(4) of the Transparency Pro-
posal). In the court’s exercise of its discretion, while 
the specific circumstances of the case will be usually 
considered, important factors for consideration also 
include whether there is an urgent need to provide 
a remedy for the judgment creditor, whether or not 
an appeal has been brought in the country of origin, 
how far those appeal proceedings have progressed, 
and what the prospect is for that appeal.”87 Professor 
De Miguel “explained that, under the CLIP Principles, 
judgments that are not yet final do not have to be en-
forced. The court has the possibility of postponing 
or refusing recognition and enforcement (Art. 4:102 
CLIP Principles). He suggested that it could perhaps 
be clarified in the comments that enforcement can 
also be made conditional, e.g. on the provision of se-
curity by the party seeking enforcement”88 (for more 
on the issue of security, see infra within paragraph 
F.). 
III. International Context
55 According to Professor De Miguel Asensio a “trend to 
favor the availability of enforcement for decisions of 
first-instance courts is becoming more common in a 
comparative perspective. In this connection, some 
systems in which regular enforceability is only pos-
sible once some or all methods of appeal available 
have been exhausted, accept that judgments may 
become provisionally enforceable before, by oper-
ation of law, or by judicial declaration. Those cases 
raise similar issues to those posed by all situations 
in which the enforceable judgment may be revised 
on appeal, such as the possibility of staying provi-
sional enforceability or making enforcement sub-
ject to a security; and the liability of the claimant in 
case a judgment was vacated on appeal after having 
been enforced. At any rate, the basic principle in the 
enforcement context remains that only judgments 
that are enforceable under the law of the country of 
origin may be enforced in foreign countries”89 (for 
more on the issue of security, see supra within par-
agraph F.).
56 The Brussels system also adopts an approach giving 
the requested State discretion to stay the proceed-
ings related to the recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment when an appeal has been lodged in 
the State of origin. In fact, Article 37 of the Brussels 
Regulation states that “1. A court of a Member State 
in which recognition is sought of a judgment given 
in another Member State may stay the proceedings 
if an ordinary appeal against the judgment has been 
lodged. 2. A court of a Member State in which rec-
ognition is sought of a judgment given in Ireland 
or the United Kingdom may stay the proceedings 
if enforcement is suspended in the State of origin, 
by reason of an appeal.” The same rule is found in 
the Lugano Convention. According to the Pocar Re-
port to this Convention “no change has been made 
to the rule that allows the court in which recogni-
tion is sought for a judgment delivered in another 
State bound by the Convention to stay the proceed-
ings if an appeal has been lodged against the judg-
ment in the other State. Article 37 reproduces Arti-
cle 30 of the 1988 Convention, and does not require 
special comment (see the Jenard report, p. 46, and 
the Schlosser report, paragraphs 195-204).”90
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also allows courts to reduce the scope of the judg-
ments or of the injunctions to be recognized and 
enforced. The commentary warrants full quotation: 
“the scope of effect of a judgment or order will be 
closely related to the content of the procedural due 
process granted to the parties in the court proceed-
ings in the foreign country where the judgment or 
order was given. Therefore it will be appropriate, in 
principle, to decide that scope in accordance with 
the law of that foreign country. However, if Japa-
nese procedural public policy (Art. 402(iii)) would be 
prejudiced, because the foreign judgment or provi-
sional measure in question has been given excessive 
effect in light of the fundamental principles of Japa-
nese procedural law, there will be no alternative to 
an exceptional reduction of the effect of the judg-
ment or order. Article 404(1) is a provision that im-
plies this sort of process.”91 With respect to the rec-
ognition and enforcement of injunction issues see 
also the paragraphs related to the effects of judg-
ment (E.), public policy (M.) and recognition and en-
forcement procedures (R.).  
61 According to the comments to the Transparency 
Proposal the severability of foreign judgments could 
be derived from the general provisions. The Proposal 
however inserts a specific rule due to the need to 
provide legal certainty.92 
62 The ALI Principles are silent on the issue of sever-
ability even though they allow the partial recogni-
tion of judgments in, for example, cases of punitive 
damages.
III.  International Context
63 The Brussels system allows for the partial recogni-
tion of foreign judgments. In fact, Article 48 estab-
lishes that “1. Where a foreign judgment has been 
given in respect of several matters and the declara-
tion of enforceability cannot be given for all of them, 
the court or competent authority shall give it for one 
or more of them. 2. An applicant may request a dec-
laration of enforceability limited to parts of a judg-
men.t” The Pocar Report confirms this result in re-
lation to Article 48 of the Lugano Convention, which 
“permits the applicant to request a partial declara-
tion of enforceability.”93 This report clarifies in de-
tailed terms the reasons why the partial recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments are to be al-
lowed. In fact, according to the report, “The most 
likely instances of a declaration of enforceability of 
this kind are those where a section of the judgment 
might be contrary to public policy, or where the ap-
plicant seeks a declaration of enforceability only for 
one or more sections of the judgment because he has 
no interest in the others, or more frequently where 
the foreign judgment deals with some matters that 
fall within the scope of the Convention and others 
IV. Discussion
57 The ALI Principles’ establishment of the requested 
court’s obligation to stay the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign but not final judgments when 
they are  the subject of review in the rendering State 
achieves the aimed for result much better than mere 
judicial discretion on the point, which is what the 
other three sets of Principles rely on. This discre-
tionary approach is also taken by Article 25.4 of the 
2001 Hague Judgment Convention, which says that 
“recognition or enforcement may be postponed [or 
refused] if the judgment is the subject of review in 
the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking a 
review has not expired,” leaving suspension to judi-
cial discretion. Yet it is to be welcomed that the CLIP 
Principles and Transparency Proposal acknowledge 
the possibility of making enforcement of final judg-
ments conditional on the provision of security by the 
party seeking enforcement (the issue of security is 
discussed above).
G. Severability
I.  Differences 
58 The CLIP Principles, the Transparency Proposal and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal each estab-
lish that foreign judgments may be partly recognised 
and enforced. Even though the ALI Principles are 
silent on this point, Section 411(2) allows enforce-
ment of a part of foreign judgments awarding puni-
tive damages. 
59 The 2001 Hague Judgment Convention also estab-
lishes that partial recognition and enforcement may 
occur in Article 34, albeit with two alternative pro-
visions, outlined in paragraph G.IV.
II. Rationale 
60 The CLIP Principles (in Article 4:101(6)), the Trans-
parency Proposal (in Article 404(1)) and the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal (in Article 402) per-
mit severability of judgments. According to the com-
mentaries to the Transparency Proposal the reason 
for this rule is that “if grounds for refusal would ap-
ply to only a part of a foreign judgment or provi-
sional measures, refusing the recognition and en-
forcement of the entire judgment or order would 
be excessive, especially for the convenience of the 
parties. Accordingly the remaining part of the judg-
ment or order not subject to the grounds for refusal 
will be recognized or enforced, and only that part 
of the foreign judgment or provisional measure will 
have effect (Art. 404(1)).” According to the Transpar-
ency Proposal commentary then, the relevant rule 
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that do not. It should be pointed out that for the ap-
plication of this provision the matters dealt with in 
the judgment need not be formally distinct. If a judg-
ment imposes several obligations only some of which 
are within the scope of the Convention, it may be 
enforced in part, provided that it clearly shows the 
aims to which the different parts of the judicial pro-
vision correspond.”94
64 According to the commentary to the Transparency 
Proposal in both Korea and Japan, foreign judgments 
may be partly recognized and enforced, which has 
been academically supported.95 
IV.  Discussion
65 From a comparative perspective, the partial recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments is a principle 
that is generally accepted. Thus, the ALI Principles’ 
silence with regard to the severability of foreign 
judgments is questionable. Yet, commentary to the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal clarifies that the 
partial recognition of foreign judgments could be de-
rived from the general rule. This seems to be exactly 
the case with the ALI Principles since those Princi-
ples allow, for instance, recognising and enforcing 
partially foreign judgments on punitive damages. 
Thus, they could be interpreted as not impeding the 
partial recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments even in cases other than those related to pu-
nitive damages. 
66 Art. 34 of The Hague Draft Convention adopts two al-
ternatives on severability. Alternative A establishes 
that “[i]f the judgment contains elements which are 
severable, one or more of them may be separately 
recognised, declared enforceable, registered for en-
forcement, or enforced.” According to Alternative 
B, “[p]artial recognition or enforcement of a judg-
ment shall be granted where: a) partial recognition 
or enforcement is applied for; or b) only part of the 
judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced 
under this Convention; or c) the judgment has been 
satisfied in part.” Therefore the Convention explic-
itly supports the approach taken by all of the sets of 
Principles, aside from the ALI Principles, by accept-
ing the possibility of partial recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments.
H. Verification of jurisdiction
I.  Differences 
67 All sets of principles adopt the so-called standard 
of equivalence approach,96 under which, to be rec-
ognized and enforced abroad, a foreign judgment 
should have been rendered by a court that would 
have had jurisdiction according to the rules of each 
set of principles or that established its jurisdiction 
according to rules equivalent to the ones in the prin-
ciples. The sets of principles involved do not follow 
the mirror-image approach under which judgments 
can be recognized and enforced only if they were 
rendered by courts that ascertained their jurisdic-
tion on the basis of being identical to the princi-
ples. Thus, for all sets of principles, judgments for-
mally based on exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction, 
and thus incompatible with the international juris-
diction rules of those principles, can still be recog-
nised and enforced when the rendering court would 
have had jurisdiction under the principles them-
selves due to the existence of other connections be-
tween the dispute and the country of origin.97 The 
standard of equivalence approach is supported by 
the 2001 Hague Draft Convention in Article 27 as is 
discussed below in paragraph H.IV. However, the 
Transparency Proposal is not so clear on this point. 
This leads to different opinions with respect to the 
Proposal. In fact, even though according to one opin-
ion, this Proposal “adopts the view that the stand-
ards for indirect jurisdiction are identical to that for 
direct jurisdiction,”98 according to another view the 
approach adopted by this Proposal does not seem to 
be very much different from the CLIP Principles ap-
proach. This seems to be supported by the commen-
tary to the relevant CLIP Principles rule according 
to which, “under these Principles, where the for-
eign state in which the judgment was rendered and 
the requested state share the same jurisdictional 
rules, we are afraid it’s not reasonable to differenti-
ate between direct and indirect jurisdictions which 
would otherwise complicate recognition of foreign 
judgments. We considered creating different rules 
to govern the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments rendered upon direct and indirect 
jurisdictions respectively. These rules should be in-
cluded in Part II (Jurisdiction). If such those rules are 
not found in Part II, it may be inferred that no such 
limitation be put upon foreign judgments to be rec-
ognized and enforced.”99
68 For all Proposals it is not necessary to list the 
grounds of jurisdiction that are deemed to be insuf-
ficient because the connection with the direct juris-
diction rules required by all sets of principles to rec-
ognise and enforce the judgments is intended to be 
enough, and also “considering the potential appli-
cation of the Principles to judgments coming from 
any country in the world, it could not be a closed 
list.”100 Yet, the understanding of the CLIP Principles 
by Prof. De Miguel Asensio is that among those un-
acceptable grounds are to be included “jurisdiction 
founded solely on the document instituting the pro-
ceedings having been served on the defendant dur-
ing his temporary presence in the rendering coun-
try, or jurisdiction based only in the presence within 
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the country of origin of property belonging to the 
defendant not directly related to the dispute.” 101
69 However, there are also some differences among the 
sets of principles at stake. In fact, only the ALI Princi-
ples differentiate explicitly between mandatory and 
discretionary grounds for non-recognition, whereas 
the CLIP Principles reach implicitly the same result 
and the other sets of principles only provide for 
mandatory grounds of non recognition. 
70 Also, with regard to default judgments, only the ALI 
Principles impose additional controls on foreign 
judgments in the form of a verification of jurisdic-
tion under the law of the rendering State. See also 
paragraph C.I. on default judgments, and paragraphs 
C.II. and C.IV. for a discussion.
II. Rationale 
71 All sets of principles adopt the standard of equiv-
alence approach, which requires that the connec-
tion between the dispute and the rendering court 
be equivalent to the connections that may provide 
direct jurisdiction under the respective principles. 
The rationale for following this approach is to pro-
vide the requested court with the necessary flexibil-
ity in a multilateral context where States do not have 
the same direct jurisdiction rules among themselves 
and even with regard to the sets of principles.102  
72 In addition, this approach allows courts to follow 
more the “purposes of the system of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments,” which “are to 
establish the well-balanced international order for 
movement of judgments by giving weight to, inter 
alia, (a) the convenience of the parties, (b) the pre-
vention of incompatible judgments, (c) judicial econ-
omy, and (d) the maintenance of public policy. In any 
particular case of recognition and enforcement, indi-
rect jurisdiction will be examined taking the stand-
ard for direct jurisdiction and these purposes into 
consideration.”103 Also, this approach is in line with 
the one followed more on a comparative perspective, 
as will be explained in paragraph H.III. 
73  With regard to default judgments the ALI Principles 
alone impose additional controls upon foreign judg-
ments by also requiring verification of jurisdiction 
under the law of the rendering State. The Comments 
to the ALI Principles describe the reason for this as 
needing to provide a “‘second look’ on jurisdictional 
issues that is necessary to safeguard due process in-
terests in the absence of a multidistrict coordination 
authority.”104 This seems to go too far however, as 
verification of jurisdiction under the law of the ren-
dering state is an obligation between the states of the 
U.S., and the idea does not translate well into the in-
ternational context (see paragraph H.IV. below for 
further discussion on this point related to default 
judgments).105
III.  International Context
74 The Brussels system outlines that there may be no 
review of a court’s jurisdiction regarding a judgment 
to be recognised and enforced, provided that the 
rendering court belongs to a State that is party to 
the Brussels system, independently of whether this 
court applied the Brussels rule on direct jurisdiction 
or its national rules referred to by Art.4 of the Brus-
sels I Regulation. There are, however, some excep-
tions to this rule, so that jurisdiction can be reviewed 
when the judgment concerns matters of insurance 
and consumer contracts, or where the rules of ex-
clusive jurisdiction are involved (art.35). The Pocar 
Report on the Lugano Convention explains that the 
working party originally considered removing any 
references to reviewing jurisdiction, but it was de-
cided that some exceptions to the general rule that 
courts shall not review the jurisdiction of the court 
of origin should remain.106
75 As for the national rules it is worth noting that while 
the mirror-image approach is followed by certain na-
tional codifications of private international law107 as 
well as several international conventions, the stand-
ard of equivalence approach has attained significant 
acceptance from a comparative perspective.108 For 
instance, in Japan, Article 118(i) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the 
foreign court is recognized under laws or regula-
tions or conventions or treaties.” This rule is inter-
preted according to the sense that the foreign court 
must have jurisdiction in the view of Japanese law.109 
According to a Japanese Supreme Court ruling of 28 
April 1998, the rules grounding the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts shall not be identical to the Japanese 
ones, but should be equivalent and the equivalent 
requirement should be assessed in light of the cir-
cumstances of the case.110
IV.  Discussion
76 All sets of principles adopt the standard of equiv-
alence approach, which requires that the connec-
tion between the dispute and the rendering court 
be equivalent to the connections that may provide 
direct jurisdiction under the respective principles. 
This approach shall be favoured because it facilitates 
the necessary flexibility and is in line with the more 
adopted approach  from a comparative perspective. 
In the light of the same flexibility, the approach of 
the ALI Principles (explicitly) and of the CLIP Prin-
ciples (implicitly) with regard to the discretionary 
grounds to deny the recognition and enforcement of 
2012 
Benedetta Ubertazzi
314 1
foreign judgments is to be welcomed. In contrast, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal and its related 
commentary do not seem to be so clear on the point. 
77 Under the Hague Draft Convention, according to Art. 
27 on “Verification of jurisdiction,”  “1. The court ad-
dressed shall verify the jurisdiction of the court of 
origin. 2. In verifying the jurisdiction of the court 
of origin, the court addressed shall be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of origin based its 
jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by de-
fault. 3. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment 
may not be refused on the ground that the court 
addressed considers that the court of origin should 
have declined jurisdiction in accordance with Arti-
cle 22.” Those rules apply the standard of equiva-
lence approach to determine at the recognition and 
enforcement stage whether the jurisdiction of the 
court of origin is acceptable, as opposed to the mir-
ror-image principle, because the standards to as-
sess the jurisdiction of the rendering court need not 
be identical with the direct jurisdiction rules of the 
Draft Hague Convention. Therefore, the Hague Draft 
Convention supports the approach taken by all of the 
sets of Principles. Under Article 27(1), the Report to 
the Hague Draft Convention states that the court can 
take the initiative to investigate the court of origin’s 
jurisdiction, without the debtor raising the issue.111
78 With regard to default judgments the ALI Principles 
impose additional controls on foreign judgments in 
the form of verification of jurisdiction under the law 
of the rendering State. Yet, such a verification of the 
jurisdiction under the law of the rendering state, 
which is imposed between the states of the U.S. by 
the rules on full faith and credit, does not seem ap-
propriate in the case of judgments rendered in for-
eign countries.112 
I. Validity and registration
I. Differences 
79 All sets of Principles present the following similari-
ties. First, they allow recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments on registered IPRs over own-
ership and entitlement issues that are not covered 
by the exclusive jurisdiction rules, even though the 
recognition and enforcement of such decisions re-
quires changes in the records of the registries of the 
State that granted the IPR at stake. Second, all sets of 
Principles allow for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments rendered in infringement or con-
tractual proceedings where the IPR validity issue was 
incidentally raised and addressed by courts sitting in 
a State that was not the country of registration, pro-
vided that the decision resulting from such a dispute 
does not affect the validity or registration of those 
rights as against third parties, or as against the same 
parties to the dispute at stake in subsequent pro-
ceedings, thus having no binding effect beyond the 
proceeding concerned. This approach is supported 
by Article 12(6) of the 2001 Hague Draft Convention. 
80 Yet, the different scope of exclusive jurisdiction 
rules in the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, and the non-ex-
istence of those rules in the Transparency Proposal 
plays an important role with regard to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, 
since the Transparency Proposal does not encom-
pass exclusive jurisdiction rules covering validity 
issues of foreign registered IPRs principally raised 
(under certain requirements), Art. 402.(i) does not 
preclude the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments rendered when validity has been 
principally challenged. However, Article 404(2) 
does provide that a decision concerning the valid-
ity of a foreign IPR is only effective “to resolve the 
dispute between the parties to the litigation.” The 
same result is reachable according to the ALI Prin-
ciples, which adopt a limited exclusive jurisdiction 
rule and allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over 
foreign IPRs validity issues principally raised under 
certain conditions, provided that the effects of the 
decisions on those issues are limited to the parties of 
the proceeding at stake. In contrast, the CLIP Princi-
ples and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal do 
not allow for adjudication of validity issues princi-
pally raised by foreign courts and therefore do not 
allow the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments on validity principally raised, not even 
with effects limited to the parties of the proceeding. 
The 2001 Hague Draft Convention supports the CLIP 
Principles and the Joint Korean and Japanese Pro-
posal in regards to validity issues principally raised, 
since it does not allow for adjudication of validity is-
sues principally raised by foreign courts, as is out-
lined below in paragraph I.IV. 
81 When the validity or scope of a IP right on which a 
foreign judgment is based is discrepant with that of 
one in the granting country, the literature comment-
ing on the Transparency Proposal suggests applying 
the public policy exception in order to not recognise 
the foreign judgments at stake.113 “Such a case oc-
curs, for example, when a Japanese patent right had 
already been invalidated by a final and binding trial 
decision of the Japanese Patent Office at the time of 
conclusion of oral proceedings in a foreign court, 
or when, although the scope of claims had been re-
stricted by a trial decision of correction or the Japan 
Patent Office, a foreign judgment awarded compen-
sation of damages or ordered injunction based on 
the original claims. In these cases, the contrariety 
to public policy may be assumed, because in these 
cases it is safe to say that the factual premise of the 
foreign judgment had been mistaken by the foreign 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Intellectual Property
2012 315 1
court,”114 Yet with regard to the effect of subsequent 
invalidation of IPRs on earlier infringement judg-
ments that became final, the commenting literature 
to the Transparency Proposal makes clear that even 
though there are discussions on the possibility of ap-
plying the public policy exception to avoid recognis-
ing the foreign judgment on infringement at stake, 
“this is an issue to be further discussed and hence 
the Transparency Proposal is not yet in the position 
to decide its standpoint.”115 The literature comment-
ing on the CLIP Principles also seems to suggest the 
non-recognition of the foreign judgment at stake at 
least when a non-validity challenge is pending be-
fore the requested state.116  For more about the pub-
lic policy exception in relation to exclusive jurisdic-
tion, see infra paragraph M.I. (the tenth point).
82 Finally only the literature commenting on the CLIP 
Principles refers to the impossibility of recognis-
ing foreign judgments resulting from proceedings 
which, have as their object, the validity or legality of 
entries in these public registers related to copyright, 
and therefore that are based only on a facilitation of 
evidence purpose since the recognition would deter-
mine a change in the registry at stake.117
II. Rationale 
83 All of the sets of Principles here analyzed adopt rules 
that demonstrate the decisive role of exclusive ju-
risdiction rules not only directly in allocating com-
petence to the courts but also indirectly in the stage 
related to the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments. Yet, this rationale is well expressed 
by the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal’s com-
ments according to which such a rule on recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments on validity and 
registration of foreign IPRs “should be located in 
the jurisdiction chapter […] and it would be suffi-
cient. Nevertheless, we wrote and include this Arti-
cle for clarity.” Also, the literature commenting on 
the CLIP Principles is clear on the point by stating 
that “the interpretation and scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction rules are decisive not only directly to al-
locate competence to the courts but also indirectly 
because due to their mandatory character they may 
decisively influence non-recognition of foreign judg-
ments. A judgment which falls foul of the provisions 
on exclusive jurisdiction does not benefit from the 
system of recognition and enforcement under the 
Principles.”118
84  Yet, all sets of Principles favor the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign decisions on disputes in 
which not only the infringement of rights registered 
in countries other than the adjudicating country is 
addressed, or the first entitlement and ownership of 
the same right, but also when their validity or reg-
istration is raised incidentally and sometimes even 
principally, even though these Principles limit the 
effects of the recognition and enforcement of the 
decisions on validity to the parties of the proceed-
ing. “This approach facilitates the adjudication be-
fore the courts of a single country of infringement 
claims in cases in which validity is incidentally chal-
lenged because it makes possible the cross-border 
enforcement of decisions rendered in these situa-
tions.”119 The rationale underlying the recognition 
and enforcement of such decisions is to foster ef-
fective cross-border litigation. The ALI Principles’ 
Comment on this point warrants full quotation: “as 
patent law becomes harmonized and more national 
trademarks and patents stem from single, multi-ju-
risdiction applications (such as the Madrid Agree-
ment, the PCT or the EPC), the need to limit the ef-
fect of declarations of invalidity may recede.”120 This 
comment is reasonably extendable, mutatis mutandis, 
to all IPRs – not just  patents and trademarks. The 
literature commenting on the CLIP Principles ren-
ders it clear that “the rationale behind the exclusive 
jurisdiction established in Article 2:401 CLIP Princi-
ples rests on the close connection of certain disputes 
with the public proceedings that determine the ex-
istence of the exclusive right and with the function-
ing of the public registries involved. The scope of 
the exclusive jurisdiction must be limited to what 
is essential to achieve its purposes.  Therefore, not 
all disputes that may result in decisions that can be 
the basis for changes in the records of the registries 
of a state fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts of the respective state. Judgments on some of 
those issues may not be concerned with the regis-
tration, grant, or the validity of the IP right as such. 
Only judgments that interfere in the functioning or 
operation of the public registry may be deemed to 
have as their object the registration of the right.”121
85 All sets of Principles invoke the public policy excep-
tion in order not to recognize and enforce a judg-
ment on the infringement of a foreign IPR where 
the validity was adjudicated incidentally, in favor of 
a subsequent judgment on the validity of the IPR at 
stake rendered by the court of its registration state. 
Yet, the literature commenting on the Transparency 
Proposal tempers this result with regard to the ef-
fect of subsequent invalidation of IPRs on earlier in-
fringement judgments that became final, as is re-
ferred to in the relevant public policyparts. 
86 Finally, the literature commenting on the CLIP Prin-
ciples makes it clear that “under the rationale of Ar-
ticle 2:401 it may be appropriate to conclude that for-
eign judgments resulting from proceedings which 
have as their object the validity or legality of entries 
in these public registers cannot be recognized in the 
country where the registry is kept.”122
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III.  International Context
87 At the international and universal level, rules im-
peding recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments dealing with issues related to IPRs granted by 
countries other than the State of the rendering court 
are absent. In contrast, The Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements provides an important 
example of an international convention explicitly al-
lowing for the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments that contain an incidental ruling on the va-
lidity of IPRs. Thus, although Article 2(2) leaves the 
validity and infringement of IPRs other than copy-
right and related rights outside the scope of appli-
cation of the Convention, save where infringement 
proceedings are brought for breach of a contract be-
tween the parties relating to such rights, the Con-
vention allows in Article 10(3) for the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in which the validity 
of IPRs arises as a preliminary question in infringe-
ment proceedings for breach of a contract, includ-
ing a choice of court agreement. 
88 In the EU/EFTA framework, Article 35 of the Brus-
sels system establishes that a judgment shall not be 
recognised if it conflicts with Section 6 of Chapter II, 
which establishes the exclusive jurisdiction rule con-
cerning foreign IPRs validity issues principally and 
incidentally raised. However, foreign judgments on 
IPRs claims that do not fall within the exclusive ju-
risdiction rules shall be recognised and enforced by 
the requested EU Member State, namely decisions 
concerning infringement of foreign IPRs, both un-
registered and those subject to registration, as well 
as decisions concerning the validity of foreign un-
registered IPRs. In addition, although exclusive juris-
diction rules exist with respect to foreign registered 
IPRs validity claims even incidentally raised, judg-
ments on those claims are also being recognised and 
enforced, at least when a non-validity challenge is 
not pending before the court of the enforcing coun-
try.123 Finally, the understanding of the Brussels sys-
tem that the foreign judgment on validity of an IPR 
given by the court at the place of registration having 
an exclusive jurisdiction on this issue cannot be rec-
ognised if in the requested State another judgment 
was already rendered or a third State already recog-
nised another judgment on the infringement of the 
same IPR is notable. This is true even if this last judg-
ment had also adjudicated the validity issue inciden-
tally raised if the two judgments lead to irreconcila-
ble results.124 This understanding acknowledges the 
breach to exclusive jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
system as interpreted by the ECJ in GAT that derives 
from the preference given to the latter judgment on 
the former. To overcome this breach, then, the inter-
pretation at stake purports to apply the Brussels sys-
tem under the presumption that the court that ren-
dered the infringement judgment that  excludes the 
recognition of the validity judgment did not adjudi-
cate on the validity incidentally raised “for defini-
tion”125 in conformity with the GAT judgment. So in-
terpreted, in fact, the two judgments would not lead 
to different results and therefore the judgment on 
validity could be recognised even if contrary to the 
judgment on the infringement, which is presumed 
not to have entered into the validity issue. It is to 
be noted that the same understanding that a judg-
ment on validity is reconcilable with a judgment on 
infringement that adjudicated the validity inciden-
tally differently to the judgment on the validity is-
sue principally raised, is adopted, for instance, with 
respect to purely internal cases in the Italian system 
by the Supreme Court.126  
89 At the national level, while certain rules refuse rec-
ognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that 
adjudicated the validity of registered IPRs of the re-
quested State,127 those rules do not impede recog-
nition and enforcement when the judgments in 
question relate to unregistered IPRs validity and in-
fringement issues, or in the case of registered IPRs 
infringement claims and validity issues incidentally 
raised. 
90 In addition, certain national systems go even fur-
ther and establish that foreign infringement and va-
lidity decisions on IPRs of the requested State that 
have been recognised and enforced in the requested 
State and that have become res judicata are typically 
not affected by a subsequent declaration of invalid-
ity by a requested State to the extent the judgments 
at stake have been enforced prior to the requested 
State’s declaration of invalidity.128 
91 Other legal systems are even more advanced. For 
example, in Japan, it seems to be possible to recog-
nise and enforce a foreign judgment on a Japanese 
IPR infringement claim or on the incidental validity 
of this right, even if the status of the Japanese IPR in 
question is now different to what it was at the time 
the foreign judgment was rendered if the change 
in status arose after the termination of the foreign 
proceedings.129 
92 Certain legal systems go even further and allow na-
tional courts not only to recognise and enforce for-
eign judgments on national IPRs claims, but also to 
adopt those judgments in order to preclude litiga-
tion in the forum State concerning national parallel 
IPRs cases. Among those systems is the U.S. system, 
where courts have already applied in several cases 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to 
use foreign judgments related to foreign IPRs claims 
to preclude litigation in the U.S. concerning national 
parallel IPRs cases on the corresponding relevant 
issues. Those cases enable the conclusion that “US 
courts have doctrinal authority to apply the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to pre-
vent parties from making their transnational intel-
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lectual property disputes ‘a war of attrition’. To date, 
they have shown some willingness to apply collat-
eral estoppel.”130 It is evident that certain U.S. deci-
sions have rejected attempts to rely on foreign judg-
ments concerning foreign IPRs to preclude litigation 
in U.S. courts on the same issues of corresponding 
U.S. IPR, considering that the foreign judgments in 
question do not present the same issues as U.S. IPR 
disputes.131 However, “none of the[se] decisions fore-
close courts from exercising this option.”132  
IV.  Discussion
93 In light of the need to effectively enforce cross-bor-
der IPRs, the approach adopted by all sets of Prin-
ciples favoring the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign decisions in disputes in which not only the 
infringement of rights registered in countries other 
than the adjudicating country is addressed, or the 
first entitlement and ownership of the same right, 
but also when their validity or registration is raised 
incidentally and sometimes even principally (ALI 
Principles, Transparency Proposal), limiting how-
ever the effects of the recognition and enforcement 
of the decisions on validity to the parties of the pro-
ceeding, is to be particularly favored. There is a trend 
in this respect in the international context. The 2001 
Hague Draft Convention, supports this result, by not 
impeding the recognition of judgments on validity 
issues incidentally raised.
94 Furthermore, in light of what has been said with re-
spect to the need to also overcome exclusive juris-
diction rules for registered IPRs validity issues prin-
cipally raised, that the ALI Principles as well as the 
Transparency Proposal do not preclude the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments rendered 
on validity issues principally addressed by courts 
sitting in a State that is not the country of registra-
tion of the rights whose validity has been princi-
pally challenged, is to be welcomed, albeit the de-
cision resulting from such a dispute is enforceable 
only between the parties to the litigation, thus it has 
no binding effect beyond the proceeding concerned. 
95 The Principles refer to the public policy exception in 
cases of conflicts between a decision on validity inci-
dentally raised, taken by courts sitting in a State that 
is not the country of registration of the rights, and 
a judgment on validity principally raised adopted 
by courts sitting in the State of registration of the 
rights. Yet, the commentaries to the Transparency 
Proposal explicitly ground this possible adoption of 
the public policy exception not on the need to safe-
guard exclusive jurisdiction rules (which the Pro-
posal does not establish anyway), but on the fact that 
the judgment to be recognised is grounded on false 
factual premises. Furthermore, the possibility left 
open by the Transparency Proposal that “non recog-
nition of the foreign judgment should not always be 
expected despite the fact that the status of IP rights 
in the granting country is now different due to the 
changes which arose after the termination of the 
foreign proceedings”133 is a good approach to take. 
This restrictive approach is also in line with the un-
derstanding of the Brussels system.
J. Finding of facts
I.  Differences 
96 Rules on the finding of facts are absent in the Trans-
parency Proposal.134  By contrast, the other three 
sets of Principles prevent the court from re-exam-
ining the “finding of facts”(4:203 CLIP) or the “sub-
stance or merit” (Art.401.2 Waseda) to the rendering 
court.  According to Section 401(2) of the Joint Ko-
rean and Japanese Proposal, “[a] foreign judgment 
may not be reviewed as to its substance or merits.” 
The Comments to the Joint Korean and Japanese Pro-
posal explicitly state that this provision “includes 
the stipulation that the requested court shall be 
bound by the facts found by the rendering court.”135 
97 Under the CLIP Principles, this limitation relates 
only to the verification of jurisdiction. The ALI Prin-
ciples and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
extend such a limitation to the verification of all re-
quirements that shall be met in order for a foreign 
judgment to be recognised and enforced. The 2001 
Hague Draft Convention follows the approach of the 
CLIP Principles, in Article 27.2, and limits re-exam-
ining the facts only in relation to the verification of 
jurisdiction, as is outlined below in paragraph J.IV. 
The limitation related to the finding of facts ap-
plies also to default judgments under both the CLIP 
Principles and the ALI Principles, unlike the Hague 
Draft Convention where it does not extend to de-
fault judgments. 
II. Rationale 
98 The rules preventing the requested court from 
re-examining the relevant facts present in the CLIP 
Principles (only with respect to the verification of ju-
risdiction)136 as well as in the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal and in the ALI Principles (with regard 
to the verification of all requirements to be met by 
a foreign judgment in order for it to be recognised 
and enforced abroad), aim at avoiding duplication 
and waste of resources,137 since “rearguing facts is 
costly and time consuming. The traditional private 
international law restriction on re-examining factual 
predicates represents an attempt to strike a balance 
between the interest in finality and the interest in 
2012 
Benedetta Ubertazzi
318 1
accuracy.”138 Also,  these rules are “common to most 
international instruments dealing with the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments.”139 As 
Professor Dessemontet pointed out “assessment by 
the court in the State where enforcement is sought 
would always be based on the facts as stated in the 
foreign judgment. Hence, at least with respect to the 
facts, the case would not have to be re-litigated.”140
99 Yet, the limitation of this rule to the verification of 
jurisdiction posed by the CLIP Principles is in line 
with the current situation in those legal systems that 
do not have a concept of issue preclusion in their res 
judicata doctrine, whereas the broader scope of the 
same rule in the ALI Principles is grounded on the 
concept of issue preclusion in the common law coun-
tries, especially the U.S.141 
100 Finally, the absence of such a limitation in the Trans-
parency Proposal is based on the fact that “concern 
rests upon keeping the requested court from un-
duly reviewing indirect jurisdiction and thus from 
failing to sufficiently protect the defendant’s pro-
cedural rights.”142
III. International Context
101 A  “traditional private international law restric-
tion”143 adopted by “quite a few international con-
ventions”144 is that in its verification of the render-
ing court’s jurisdiction the requested authority shall 
be bound by the findings of fact on which the ren-
dering State’s court based its jurisdiction. At the in-
ternational level see, for instance, the Hague Draft 
Convention already recalled, as well as Art. 25 of The 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Re-
spect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for 
the Protection of Children of 1996. At the EU level 
see Article 35(2) Brussels I Regulation, according to 
which, “In its examination of the grounds of juris-
diction referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the 
court or authority applied to shall be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of the Member 
State of origin based its jurisdiction.”145 
IV. Discussion
102 The rules preventing the requested court from 
re-examining the relevant facts present in the CLIP 
Principles, Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal and 
the ALI Principles avoid a waste of resources and 
therefore shall be favored.146 According to Art. 27.2 
of the Hague Draft Convention on Verification of Ju-
risdiction, “in verifying the jurisdiction of the court 
of origin, the court addressed shall be bound by the 
findings of fact on which the court of origin based its 
jurisdiction, unless the judgment was given by de-
fault.” Thus, this limitation only applies to the ver-
ification of jurisdiction, supporting the approach 
taken in the CLIP Principles, but not to other cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, the limitation related to 
the finding of facts does not concern default judg-
ments. The concerns at the absence of those rules 
in the Transparency Proposal related to those find-
ings can be addressed by the recourse to the public 
policy exception. 
K. Jurisdiction rules protecting 
consumers or employees
I. Differences
103 The CLIP Principles are the only set of Principles to 
include rules on the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments manifestly incompatible with 
specific jurisdictional rules protecting consumers 
and employees. Yet, those principles adopt a flexible 
approach leaving to the court discretion ins deciding 
whether to recognise the foreign judgment at stake 
or not. Also, “this ground for non-recognition is to 
be interpreted restrictively, because it requires that 
the foreign judgment is ‘manifestly incompatible’ 
with the specific jurisdictional rules protecting con-
sumers or employees in the state of recognition.”147
104 No such rules are present in the ALI Principles, the 
Transparency Proposal, or the Joint Korean and Jap-
anese Proposal. However, in some cases, interna-
tional jurisdictional protection of consumers and 
employees may be regarded as a public policy is-
sue and then the general clauses of public policy in-
cluded by the three sets of Principles at stake may 
be used to decline recognition and enforcement of 
a foreign judgment that is clearly discrepant with 
such protection. Furthermore, with regard to the 
ALI Principles, Section 403(1)(f) may be relevant, be-
cause it establishes a mandatory ground for non-rec-
ognition of foreign judgments when the rendering 
court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of a stand-
ard form choice of court agreement, which was con-
trary to the safeguards mentioned in § 202(4). Thus, 
although this Section applies generally to situations 
in which standard form agreements are used and 
only foresees involvement in choice of forum agree-
ment cases, it could play a role in consumer and em-
ployee contracts in which a standard form agree-
ment is used. 
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II.  Rationale 
105 The only sets of Principles with special rules specifi-
cally aimed at consumers or employees are the CLIP 
Principles. These rules were adopted to reflect the 
fact that many countries have adopted legislative 
rules on jurisdiction aimed at protecting consumers 
and employees148 and are grounded in the fact that 
there is no common understanding on the grounds 
for jurisdiction in relation to the matters at stake.149 
III.  International Context
106 In the international legal order, due to the diver-
sity of the standards on consumer and employee 
protection both at the substantive and at the PIL 
level, uniform jurisdiction and enforcement rules 
in global conventions have not been adopted as of 
yet. Furthermore, those rules were greatly debated 
and raised “insurmountable problems”150 in the ne-
gotiations at the Hague Conference on the proposed 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, and in the end it 
did not include jurisdictional rules specifically pro-
tecting consumers or employees. The 2005 Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements excludes 
consumer and employment contracts from its scope 
of application (Article 2.1).151 
107 At the EU level, Art. 35.1 of the Brussels system does 
not include the jurisdiction rules on  employee pro-
tection subject to mandatory verification at the stage 
of recognition and enforcement. The Pocar Report 
to the Lugano Convention explains that the idea of 
adding the violation of rules of jurisdiction on in-
dividual employment contracts to the group of ex-
ceptions that allow verification of the court of or-
igin’s jurisdiction was ultimately rejected. This is 
because in employment disputes, the employee nor-
mally brings the action. Therefore, if the employee is 
trying to gain recognition of the ruling in his or her 
favor in a foreign court, allowing the court to verify 
the jurisdiction of the court or origin will normally 
benefit the employer (as the defendant), by delay-
ing proceedings.152
108 At the national level, States adopt highly differ-
ent levels of protection in their respective sub-
stantive and PIL rules on consumer and employee 
protection.153
IV.  Discussion
109 The CLIP Principles inclusion of a specific rule re-
lated to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments manifestly incompatible with specific ju-
risdictional rules protecting consumers and employ-
ees is to be welcomed.  It is true that the same practi-
cal outcome can be reached throughout the general 
clauses of public policy included by the other three 
sets of Principles. Nevertheless, given the excep-
tional nature of such a clause it is better to rely on a 
more specific provision. The same can be said with 
regard to the possibility of relying on Section 403.1.f 
of the ALI Principles to achieve consumer and em-
ployee protection with respect to international ju-
risdiction. Hence, this Section only envisages cases 
in which a choice of forum agreement is involved, 
which is not always the case in consumer and em-
ployee situations.
L. Provisional and 
protective measures
I. Differences
110 Under the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles, 
provisional measures adopted by courts that do not 
have the jurisdiction to hear the merits cannot be 
recognized or enforced abroad, in line with the ap-
proach adopted by the proposal to recast the Brus-
sels Regulation (Art. 2 of the Commission Proposal), 
by the European instruments on unitary industrial 
property rights and by the Hague Draft Convention, 
as will be outlined below in paragraphs L.III. and L.IV. 
respectively. The CLIP Principles clarify that this re-
strictive approach does not preclude the application 
of a more liberal approach i.e. in a context of regional 
integration or under a conventional regime, accord-
ing to the favor recognitionis principle.154 In contrast, 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal is unclear 
on the point, although the explanatory notes seem 
to adopt the same requirement by stating that “it is 
meaningful to clarify that extraterritorial enforce-
ment is available only for provisional or protective 
measures rendered in the state that has the jurisdic-
tion to hear the merits.”155 The Transparency Pro-
posal does not adopt this requirement, which can 
lead to different results. 
111 
112 Under the CLIP Principles, the Transparency Pro-
posal and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, 
provisional or protective measures adopted inau-
dita altera parte cannot be recognised or enforced 
abroad. Although the ALI Principles do not expressly 
exclude the recognition and enforcement of ex parte 
provisional measures, the same conclusion can be 
reached under § 403 (1)(a)-(d). This provision en-
sures the respect of procedural guarantees, includ-
ing proper and timely notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. This criterion is in line with the Brussels 
system corresponding rule, as will be highlighted 
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in paragraph L.III. Yet, the critics to this limitation 
pursued the Commission Proposal related to the re-
casting of the Brussels I Regulation to overcome it, 
as will be explained in paragraphs L.III. and L.IV.. 
Finally, the Transparency Proposal includes the re-
quirement that the measure should be adopted after 
the opposing party is given an opportunity to state 
an opinion on the validity of rights in question in the 
foreign proceedings in which the provisional meas-
ures were granted. While this requirement is not ex-
plicitly present under the other three sets of Princi-
ples, a similar result can be reached in practice since 
those sets of Principles grant to opponents the gen-
eral right to be heard, which presumably would in-
clude the right to state an opinion as to the validity 
of the IPR involved. 
113 The Transparency Proposal includes the require-
ment that “if a court implements the execution of 
a provisional measure of a foreign court, the court 
may require the party seeking enforcement to pro-
vide security.” Yet, this requirement is not present 
under the other three sets of Principles. However, as 
mentioned above in paragraph D.I., a court requiring 
the party seeking enforcement to provide security 
is generally understood to also be compatible with 
the CLIP Principles.156
II. Rationale 
114 The limitation that provisional measures adopted by 
courts that do not have the jurisdiction to hear the 
merits cannot be recognised and enforced abroad 
is grounded in the traditional distinction between 
provisional measures adopted by a court competent 
over the merits and those adopted by a court lacking 
such jurisdiction. This approach is also in line with 
the view emerging in the international context, as 
will be recalled at paragraph L.III. Yet, the absence of 
this limitation in the Transparency Proposal seems 
to favor the recognition and enforcement of provi-
sional measures, in line with the view emerging in 
literature that criticises the limitation at stake.157 
115 The rationale of the limitation that provisional or 
protective measures adopted inaudita altera parte  is 
that although Art. 50.2 of the TRIPs Agreement al-
lows courts to adopt provisional measures inaudita 
altera parte,158 the TRIPs agreement does not harmo-
nise the standards concerning the protection of the 
right to be heard and the characteristics of ex parte 
procedures and does not impose on Member States 
an obligation to recognize foreign decisions on ex 
parte measures, since it does not address PIL issues. 
The exclusion of the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign measures adopted inaudita altera parte is 
grounded on the fact that those Principles are ap-
plicable to judgments rendered by countries where 
standards concerning the protection of the right 
to be heard and the characteristics of ex parte pro-
cedures may vary significantly. The same result is 
reachable under the Transparency Proposal’s corre-
sponding rule, which requires that the provisional 
measures should only be adopted if the opposing 
party was given an opportunity to state an opinion 
on the validity of rights in question in the foreign 
proceedings in which the provisional measures were 
granted.  The purpose of this rule is “to exclude for-
eign provisional measures that were issued simply 
based on a petition filed for the purpose of abuse or 
harassment on the basis of an IP right of dubious cre-
ation or existence.”159 In other words, this limita-
tion is posed “for the purpose of equally protecting 
the debtor, only when he/she is given an opportu-
nity to challenge the judgment shall such protec-
tive measures against him/her be recognized and 
enforced.”160
116 The Transparency Proposal also poses a rule that “if 
a court implements the execution of a provisional 
measure of a foreign court, the court may require 
the party seeking enforcement to provide security.” 
This rule reflects the reality that “provisional meas-
ures will sometimes be petitioned for in an IP or un-
fair competition dispute in order to pressure the 
obligor and just to observe his/her reaction and re-
sponse,” and therefore the purpose of this require-
ment “is to make good use of provision on security 
for testing the obligee’s seriousness about protect-
ing his/her own right.”161 Yet, the provision of se-
curity is based on the requested court’s discretion-
ary power. The other proposals do not explain why 
they do not provide this requirement, although as 
mentioned in paragraph L.I supra, a requirement for 
the party intending to enforce the judgment to pro-
vide security is generally understood to also be pos-
sible under the CLIP Principles.162
III. International Context
117 In the international framework, the limitation that 
provisional measures adopted by courts that do not 
have jurisdiction to hear the merits shall not be rec-
ognised and enforced abroad is posed by Art. 23(b) 
of the Hague Draft Convention, as will be explained 
in paragraph L.IV. 
118 In the EU the limitation that provisional measures 
adopted by courts that do not have the jurisdiction 
to hear the merits shall not be recognised and en-
forced abroad is posed by Article 103.2 Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on Com-
munity trademarks (OJ L 78, 24 March 2009, pp. 1-42, 
p. 25); and Article 90 Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 De-
cember 2001 on Community designs (OJ L 3, 5 Janu-
ary 2002, pp. 1-24).163 The same limitation is posed 
by the 2010 Commission Proposal on the reform of 
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the Brussels I Regulation, according to which for the 
purposes of recognition and enforcement, “the term 
‘judgment’ includes provisional, including protec-
tive measures ordered by a court which by virtue of 
this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance 
of the matter” (Art. 2). Yet, if the court that has ju-
risdiction as to the merits with regard to the rec-
ognition and enforcement adopts the provisional 
measure at stake, the Draft Proposal for a recast-
ing of the Brussels Regulation can lead to impor-
tant achievements, as Professor Ricolfi highlights: 
“let us imagine a provisional, including protective, 
measure issued by State A in our hypothetical case 
[…], concerning infringement of a patent in Germany 
(Member State of the Court saised and of defend-
ant’s domicile) and in the UK. The infringement pro-
ceeding may well be stayed as far as the UK patent 
is concerned, if an invalidity issue is raised by de-
fendant; this rather unfortunate consequence may 
be rather effectively counterbalanced by the possi-
bility that the German Court may nevertheless give 
interim relief not only for Germany but also for the 
UK. The novel feature, indeed a giant leap forward, 
is that now this relief is immediately enforceable 
by combining Art. 36, 38(2)” on the abolition of ex-
equatur (see the paragraph on the recognition and 
enforcement procedures (R.)) “and the definition of 
judgments under Art. 3(a) of the Draft proposal.”164 
Furthermore, “even provisional, including protec-
tive, measures may be assisted by penalties. If this 
is the case,”165 then what will be mentioned in the 
paragraph on recognition and enforcement proce-
dures (paragraph R.) applies with regard to injunc-
tions as well. 
119 In the EU, the limitation that excludes from recogni-
tion and enforcement foreign provisional measures 
adopted without prior hearing to the adverse party 
and enforceable without prior service of process to 
that party (although Art.50(2) TRIPS as well as the EU 
enforcement Directive 2004/48 implementing TRIPS 
recognize those measures), is posed by the current 
version of the relevant rules of the Brussels System, 
as interpreted by the ECJ starting from the Denilauer 
case.166 Yet, critics to the Denilauer’s approach led 
the EU Commission to revisit it. In fact, Recitals 22 
and 25 of the 2010 Commission Proposal on the re-
form of the Brussels I Regulation recalls the harmo-
nisation rules of Directive 2004/48 on provisional 
ex parte measures, and Article 2(a) also extends the 
recognition and enforcement system of the Brussels 
Regulation to ex parte measures provided that “the 
defendant has the right to challenge the measure 
subsequently under the national law of the Member 
State of origin.”167 This more liberal approach is be-
ing favored by the literature according to which “the 
Commission is right to revisit the thirty-year-old 
Denilauler-jurisprudence […] and to clarify that [ex 
parte provisional] measures can be recognised and 
enforced on the basis of the Regulation if the defend-
ant has the ‘right to challenge the measure subse-
quently under the national law of the Member State 
of origin’ (Art. 2(a), Recital 25 4th sentence CP). As it 
has been pointed out in legal scholarship, both con-
sistency with Directive 2004/48/EC153 (which ex-
plicitly requires Member States to introduce ex parte 
relief) and the more flexible approach of both the ECJ 
and the ECHR in the interpretation of the right to be 
heard in the context of provisional measures mili-
tate in favour of such a more liberal approach.”168 
120 Finally, at the national level, certain countries do not 
allow recognition and enforcement of provisional and 
protective measures (e.g., see Italian Law, Japanese 
law).169
IV. Discussion
121 The limitation proper to the ALI Principles, the CLIP 
Principles and the Joint Korean and Japanese Pro-
posal related to the provisional measures adopted 
by courts that do not have the jurisdiction to hear 
the merit and cannot be recognised and enforced 
abroad is in line with the same approach adopted by 
the Hague Draft Convention. This Convention says in 
Article 23: “[Alternative A. 1. A decision ordering a 
provisional and protective measure, which has been 
taken by a court seised with the claim on the mer-
its, shall be recognised and enforced in Contracting 
States in accordance with Articles [25, 27-34]. 2. In 
this article a reference to a provisional or protective 
measure means – a) a measure to maintain the sta-
tus quo pending determination of the issues at trial; 
or b) a measure providing a preliminary means of 
securing assets out of which an ultimate judgment 
may be satisfied; or c) a measure to restrain conduct 
by a defendant to prevent current or imminent fu-
ture harm.];” “[Alternative B. Orders for provisional 
and protective measures issued in accordance with 
Article 13 shall be recognised and enforced in the 
other Contracting States in accordance with Arti-
cles [25, 27-34].” Thus, both alternatives establish 
that provisional measures adopted by courts that 
do not have the jurisdiction to hear the merits shall 
not be recognized and enforced abroad: Alternative 
A by referring to “a decision ordering a provisional 
and protective measure, which has been taken by 
a court seised with the claim on the merits;” Alter-
native B by referring to “orders for provisional and 
protective measures issued in accordance with Arti-
cle 13” and thus by connecting Art. 23.A alternative 
b) to Art. 13 of the Hague Draft Convention. Yet, the 
Transparency Proposal’s absence of such require-
ment is in line with the view that criticiszs this lim-
itation, highlighting the “disadvantages” to which 
it may lead.170
122 The approach adopted by the CLIP Principles, the 
Transparency Proposal and the Joint Korean and Jap-
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anese Proposal explicitly, and by the ALI Principles 
implicitly, with respect to the exclusion of the recog-
nition and enforcement of ex parte provisional meas-
ures can be criticized for the same reasons, mutatis 
mutandis, highlighted in relation to the correspond-
ent limitation of the current Brussels system, which 
led the EU Commission to overcome the limitation at 
stake.171 This approach could therefore be overcome 
by rules such as the favour recognitionis principle ex-
plicitly posed by the CLIP Principles and by allow-
ing the recognition of such measures in the context 
of regional integration, especially in light of the EU 
Brussels system’s future overcoming of the limita-
tion at stake.172 
M. Public policy
I.  Differences
123 All sets of Principles refer to the public policy excep-
tion as a ground to refuse recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments. Yet, the CLIP Principles 
refer to procedural public policy and substantive 
public policy in different rules, and the literature 
commenting on those principles discusses some ex-
amples from the CLIP Principles in a more general 
way.173 The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal re-
fers to procedural public policy together with sub-
stantive public policy. In contrast, the Transparency 
Proposal refers to “public policy” without any fur-
ther distinction, but the literature accompanying the 
Transparency Proposal provides a very long and pre-
cise list of cases where public policy can be adopted. 
The ALI Principles refer to “public policy” as such, 
but then contain three specific grounds for non-rec-
ognition and enforcement in connection with pro-
cedure. The 2001 Hague Draft Convention also re-
fers to both substantive and procedural policy, as 
is outlined below in paragraph M.IV. Furthermore, 
the CLIP Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
both deem the rule on procedural public policy to 
be sufficient to refuse recognition in cases of fraud 
and therefore do not contain a separate ground for 
non-recognition related to fraud. This point is well 
explained by Professor Pedro de Miguel Asensio in 
his discussion of recognition and enforcement in 
the CLIP Principles: “fraud provisions in the field of 
recognition are typically aimed at providing a de-
fense against situations in which a fraudulent ac-
tion by the prevailing party deprived the other party 
of a reasonable opportunity to defend its case. To 
the extent that one of the parties, typically the de-
fendant was deprived of such an opportunity in the 
original proceedings, recourse to the provision on 
procedural public policy seems sufficient to refuse 
recognition.”174 In contrast, the ALI Principles do not 
deem the rule on procedural public policy to be suf-
ficient to deal with cases of fraud and therefore con-
tain a specific rule for non-recognition or enforce-
ment related to fraud in connection with procedure. 
124 Under the CLIP Principles, the incompatibility with 
public policy should be manifest to allow refusal to 
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. Also, the 
Comments to the ALI Principles make clear that “the 
intent [of Section 403.1.a)-c) and e)] is to describe a 
narrow category of cases.”175 The intent of the Trans-
parency Proposal to describe a narrow category of 
cases is expressed well by the specifications of the 
public policy exception provided for by the corre-
sponding Comments or relevant literature inter-
preting the principles. In contrast, in the Joint Ko-
rean and Japanese Proposal concrete illustrations 
are lacking, except for typical cases referred to by 
the commentary on the rule on public policy and 
further specified in Articles 406 and 407, involving 
a foreign judgment that awards punitive damages 
and inconsistency with a precedent domestic judg-
ment.176 In contrast, the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal does not refer either to the “manifest” in-
compatibility of the foreign judgment with the pub-
lic policy of the requested State, or to the “degree” 
of such incompatibility being of an important na-
ture, and therefore uses wording that does not im-
mediately highlight the exceptional character of the 
public policy rule. 
125 For simplification purposes, the following remarks 
will examine each of these specifications of the pub-
lic policy exception, with the footnotes recalling the 
relevant sets of principles that provide for the spec-
ification at stake, and with the text recalling ther-
ationales. Therefore, the corresponding paragraph 
M.II. will refer to this paragraph as far as the ration-
ale for each specification is concerned. 
126 Recourse to public policy can be adopted to deny 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
in the following cases. 
127 First, where a foreign judgment on the scope of a na-
tional patent has strong consequences on the avail-
ability of products necessary to meet health and 
safety requirements, the requested State may choose 
to adopt the public policy exception to deny recog-
nition of this type of judgment.177 
128 Second, the public policy exception may be adopted 
to exclude the recognition of a foreign judgment on 
the patentability of bio-technological inventions 
that can be interpreted in the requested State to be 
against human dignity.178 
129 Third, the public policy exception could be adopted 
to deny recognition to foreign judgments that dis-
regard the moral rights of authors.179 
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130 Fourth, recognition of foreign judgments can be de-
nied when it is determined that the foreign court ad-
mitted evidence accessed through certain mecha-
nisms used to fight allegedly infringing activities on 
the Internet, but obtained in a way that failed to re-
spect the fundamental right to the accused infring-
er’s private life and data protection.180 
131 Fifth, recourse to procedural public policy can be 
made to refuse recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments when the foreign judgment was 
adopted without respecting the right of the parties 
to substantiate their claims, in light of the fact that 
the parties had not been given “a proper opportu-
nity to produce allegations concerning the validity 
and scope of a right.” This is because in infringement 
proceedings, parties shall always be granted the op-
portunity to produce a defence of invalidation or a 
counter-defense of correction, since those defenses 
“concern the validity and scope of the right itself 
and will have a great influence on the conclusion of 
the disputes.”181  
132 Sixth, recourse to procedural public policy can be 
made to refuse recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments when the foreign judgment was 
adopted without respecting the right of the parties 
to present all relevant evidence, for instance, as a 
consequence of a fraudulent behaviour.182 
133 Seventh, the public policy exception can be adopted 
for refusing to recognize or enforce a foreign judg-
ment rendered on the basis of a procedure contrary 
to the right to a fair trial posed by Article 6 ECHR, as 
the ECtHR maintained on several occasions183 and 
the ECJ confirmed by interpreting the public pol-
icy exception of Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Reg-
ulation in light of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Arti-
cle 6 ECHR.184 
134 Eighth, the public policy exception can be adopted 
where a foreign court ruled on an invention that em-
ployed extremely advanced technology without the 
aid of specialists with sufficient knowledge to under-
stand the content of the invention.185 
135 Ninth, the public policy exception can be adopted 
to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment in light of the fact that the judgment was 
concluded on matters “not to be decided in courts 
proceedings under the law of the granting coun-
try,” because in certain systems, such as Japan, the 
compulsory licence of patent rights and copyrights 
(award systems) are decided by administrative au-
thorities, and thus their adjudication by judicial-
bodies allowed under other systems, such as France, 
cannot recognised in the former systems due to the 
recourse to public policy.186
136 Tenth, “contrariety to public policy may come into 
question when the validity or scope of a IP right on 
which a foreign judgment is granted is discrepant 
with that in the granting country.”187 Yet, this re-
sult should be tempered: “there are discussions on 
whether or not circumstances after the delivery of 
a foreign judgment can be taken into account un-
der public policy where the system of automatic 
recognition is adopted.  Even if such circumstances 
can be taken into consideration, non-recognition 
of the foreign judgment should not always be ex-
pected despite the fact that the status of IP rights 
in the granting country is now different due to the 
changes which arose after the termination of the 
foreign proceedings. For example, when allegations 
on the invalidation or correction of a Japanese pat-
ent right had not been produced in a timely manner 
in foreign proceedings, or when the actual content 
of a request for correction to be made by the Japan 
Patent Office was discrepant from that asserted in 
foreign proceedings, there might be room to recog-
nize the foreign judgment in Japan. This conclusion 
might be justified, since, according to Article 104-3 of 
the Japanese Patent Act which allows parties to pro-
duce allegations for the invalidation of a patent in 
infringement proceedings, overdue allegations must 
be dismissed.”188 This conclusion finds support in the 
Transparency Proposal itself. First, the Proposal im-
plicitly rejects the safeguarding of exclusive juris-
diction rules as a grounding basis for a public pol-
icy exception, as it is not included in the list of cases 
provided for by the comments to the same Proposal, 
where the public policy exception can be adopted to 
refuse to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment. 
Second, while this proposal acknowledges the pos-
sibility of adopting the public policy exception for 
non-enforcement of a judgment that was based on 
the (in)validity or the scope of an IPR that is discrep-
ant with that in the granting country, it grounds this 
possibility not on the need to safeguard exclusive ju-
risdiction rules but rather on the fact that the for-
eign judgment at stake is based on a mistaken factual 
premise related to the validity of the IPR involved.189 
The same conclusion finds support in the compara-
tive perspective, particularly in light of the under-
standing of the Brussels system in relation with the 
inconsistency of judgments (see infra). 
137 Eleventh, according to the Transparency Proposal 
the public policy exception prevents recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in cases where 
the judgment at stake does not apply certain provi-
sions of the granting State. In fact, the recourse to 
public policy can be grounded on the granting State’s 
nature of the rules that have not been applied regu-
lating “matters such as the filing of application, reg-
istration, or cancellation of registration” of IPRs;190 
“initial ownership for a right to obtain a patent;” 
“the existence, validity and initial ownership of a 
non-registered right, and matters such as the pro-
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tection period, effect (scope of protection, etc.) and 
transferability of both registered rights and non-reg-
istered rights.”191 In fact, “it seems to be unargua-
ble that, for instance, grounds for the invalidation 
of patents should be governed only by the law of the 
registered country. In other words, these provisions 
are a sort of internationally mandatory rules, the ap-
plication of which is always to be ensured,” and “ap-
plication of such rules […] come into question under 
the Transparency Proposal because it does not pro-
vide for exclusive jurisdiction for the actions con-
cerning the validity of registered IPRs (see Article 
103 and the Comments) and, as a result, even a for-
eign judgment determining the validity of patents 
of Japan or of a third country may be recognised and 
enforced in Japan. It cannot be accepted that those 
matters may not be governed by the law other than 
that of the registered country, even if the effect of 
a foreign judgment pertaining to the invalidity of a 
registered right is limited to having an inter partes 
effect as set forth in Articles 103(3) and 404(2).”192 
This approach is then in line with the opinion that 
to overcome  exclusive jurisdiction rules, it requires 
the requested State to verify the law applied by the 
court that rendered the judgment to be recognised 
and enforced.193 In any case, recourse to the pub-
lic policy exception to refuse to recognize and en-
force a foreign judgment with the aim of safeguard-
ing the granting State’s internationally mandatory 
rules shall be excluded in the following cases. First, 
when the foreign court did not apply the granting 
State’s rules on remedies for infringement of IPRs 
or IPRs contracts, since those provisions cannot be 
characterised as internationally mandatory rules. 
Second, when the foreign court failed to apply the 
granting State’s rules in case of IPRs ubiquitous in-
fringements, since “it cannot be supposed that the 
law of the granting country should always be applied 
in such a case.”194 Finally, under the principle of no 
review on the merits of foreign judgments in the 
recognition and enforcement stage, which is gen-
erally accepted around the world, the appropriate-
ness of the interpretation and the application of the 
granting State’s relevant rules by the foreign court 
cannot be questioned in principle. Consequently 
the requested court cannot refuse to recognize and 
enforce a foreign judgment in cases of misappro-
priation and misapplication of the granting State’s 
provisions. Similarly, from a judicial economy per-
spective the requested court cannot refuse to recog-
nize and enforce a foreign judgment when the ap-
plication of the relevant provision of a State other 
than the granting State, instead of this latter State’s 
mandatory rules “does not affect the conclusion of 
the judgment.”195 
138 Twelfth, the ALI Principles establish “some connec-
tion between the rules on applicable law and the 
rules on enforcement. If the original court did not 
apply the ALI Principles on applicable law, it need 
not recognize or enforce the foreign judgment.”196 In 
fact, the ALI Principles allow for the adoption of the 
public policy exception to deny recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments when the rendered 
court applied national laws or laws other than the 
ones established as applicable by the ALI Principles, 
i.e. without respecting the territoriality principle 
or awarding damages “deleteriously impact[ing] lo-
cal interests.”197 The reason for so doing is well ex-
pressed by the ALI Principles’ Comments, according 
to which “the Principles recognize that much of the 
controversy concerning adjudication of multiterri-
torial intellectual property claims derives from ap-
prehensions that the court will apply laws inappro-
priate to the multinational character of the case, in 
particular, that the court will apply its own State’s 
law to the full range of alleged infringements occur-
ring outside the forum. […] For this reason, Part III 
offers provisions on applicable law. The general rule 
of territoriality strongly informs these provisions 
[…] Judgments applying laws designated in a man-
ner consistent with territoriality will not be enforced 
and recognised.”198 “By contrast, both the CLIP Prin-
ciples and the Transparency Proposal seem to sepa-
rate these aspects completely.”199 In fact, the Trans-
parency Proposal explicitly declines this possible 
adoption of the public policy exception in relation 
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments issues, in light of the fact that “such a strict 
meaning of the principle of territoriality”200 should 
not be taken, accepting derogations to this princi-
ple on some occasions. The absence of control (save 
for the respect of the territorial nature of IPRs with 
regard to injunctions, see the relevant paragraphs 
related to the effects of judgments (E.)) is explained 
by the literature commenting on the CLIP Princi-
ples, emphasising that those principles are in line 
with the international trend to focus on the verifi-
cation of jurisdiction rather than on the verification 
of the law applied. In fact, “making enforcement of 
a foreign judgment conditional on the application 
of the right law inevitably leads to a very in-depth 
review of the case. In the end, this comes down to a 
review of the merits and this is exactly what recog-
nition and enforcement proceedings are supposed 
to avoid.”201 Yet, the literature commenting on the 
Transparency Proposal highlights that in patent law, 
procedural and substantive aspects are often inex-
tricably interwoven. In such cases, should a foreign 
judgment that applied a law different from the one 
designated by the applicable law rules of the enforce-
ment court be recognized and enforced? Wouldn’t 
that result in the rules of the enforcement court be-
ing bypassed and couldn’t this be problematic in 
situations where procedural and substantive issues 
are interwoven? In this respect, one could wonder 
whether the ALI Principles aren’t more appropriate, 
because they do establish a connection between the 
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applicable law rules and the rules on recognition and 
enforcement.”202
139 Apart from the aforementioned exceptional situa-
tions, public policy is a last resort mechanism. There-
fore, even when the public policy exception can, in 
principle, be adopted to deny recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments, it should be limited 
in the following two ways. First, “the enforcement 
court should consider only the outcome of litigation, 
not the substance or procedure by which the out-
come was achieved. Second, the court should con-
sider how the outcome affects interests in the fo-
rum State and whether any clash with local interests 
can be softened through the remedial procedures,” 
an approach that “allow[s] the enforcement court 
to tailor the remedy to local concerns”203 rather 
than to deny recognition and enforcement of the 
foreign judgment in question. “In fact, the reme-
dial approach is particularly appropriate in an in-
ternational setting, where cultural differences and 
levels of technological development are so widely 
disparate.”204 
140 In any case, a civil judgment based on a jury verdict, 
in principal, should not be regarded as contrary to 
public policy in countries that do not use civil ju-
ries.205 Also, differences with respect to the availa-
bility of discovery devices between the country of 
origin and the requested country should not be an 
obstacle to the enforcement of the judgment.206 Also, 
the CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles both pro-
vide that the public policy exception shall not be 
adopted with regard to punitive damages, since a 
part of those damages might be acceptable under 
the severability of the foreign judgment approach 
(see above). The Transparency Proposal also pro-
vides that sometimes the public policy exception 
will not be invoked in relation to punitive damages, 
and that “a part of punitive damages award might 
be acceptable in Japan.”207 The Comments to the ALI 
Principles provide that the public policy exception 
“should not provide an opportunity for relitigation 
of the case.” This requirement is also explicitly men-
tioned in the Transparency Comments. 
141 So, the different sets of Principles and their related 
commentaries and literature contain many differ-
ent public policy grounded specifications for the re-
fusal of recognition and enforcement. However, as 
discussed at paragraph M.IV. below, this does not 
necessarily mean the different sets of Principles will 
reach different results where the specifications men-
tioned differ between them.
II.  Rationale 
142 Professor de Miguel Asensio explains the rationale 
for explicitly including both substantive and pro-
cedural public policy within the public policy ex-
ception: “Article 4:401 CLIP Principles refers to sub-
stantive and procedural public policy in separate 
provisions. Although in some conventions substan-
tive and procedural public policy are mixed in the 
same provision and some international, regional, 
and national instruments do not include a spe-
cific reference to procedural public policy, it has 
been considered appropriate to deal with substan-
tive and procedural public policy in different pro-
visions. This approach is also a feature of many na-
tional systems.”208 
143 The reasoning behind the rejection of the approach 
that provides for the specification of the public pol-
icy exception directly in the relevant rule, rather 
than in the corresponding commentary, is well ex-
pressed by the commentaries to the Transparency 
Proposal Comments:  first, “there were difficulties 
in creating an exhaustive list of stipulations due 
to the wide variety of circumstances peculiar to IP 
disputes” and second, “there were concerns raised 
that a public policy clause with a long list of consid-
erations would lead to the misconception that the 
Transparency Proposal was very reluctant to rec-
ognise foreign judgments regarding IP disputes.”209 
144 The intent of all of the sets of Principles is to describe 
a narrow category of cases, as explained in detail in 
paragraph M.I. Furthermore, while the different sets 
of Principles and their accompanying commentaries 
and literature may set out different specifications for 
where public policy can ground refusal of recogni-
tion and enforcement, the Principles may all reach 
the same result in the end, as is discussed below in 
paragraph M.IV.
III.  International Context
145 The common view is that the public policy excep-
tion should be adopted in a restrictive way in IPRs 
transnational litigation.210 The same view highlights 
that the public policy exception to the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments includes 
both substantive and procedural public policy.211 Al-
though public policy is typically a national defense 
based on the basic values and fundamental princi-
ples of a national legal system, in the case of public 
policy as a ground for non-recognition the doctrine 
is to be understood within the stricter sense of in-
ternational public policy in both categories of sub-
stantive and procedural public policy. It should be 
applied in a restrictive and exceptional way, lim-
ited to situations in which requested court can easily 
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ascertain the violation of public policy; and the in-
compatibility with the requested State’s public pol-
icy must be manifest.212 Usually, the rules on public 
policy are general rules that do not specify the cases 
where this exception can be adopted to deny recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Yet, 
the literature and case that comments and applies 
those rules renders this specification.
146 With respect to IP law, the literature and case law 
highlight that the important approximations of na-
tional substantive and procedural laws regarding the 
means of enforcing IPRs reduce the level of dispari-
ties between national legislations, particularly with 
respect to basic principles.213 Furthermore, owing to 
the economic component of IP law civilization, con-
flicts are lacking in this field.214 Therefore, the forum 
State court cannot adopt the public policy exception 
of a substantive nature to avoid the recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign judgment based on what-
ever differences there are in substantive laws, but 
rather in very limited cases where the differences 
reflect diverging options followed by the countries 
involved as to where to strike the balance between 
IPRs and other conflicting values, interests and even 
fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expres-
sion and information, the right of education and the 
protection of health care.215 
147 recent case law originating in various countries of 
the world also confirm the exceptional nature of 
public policy with regard to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. In the U.S., in 
the Sarl Louis Feraud International v. Viewfinder, Inc. 
Judgment,216 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit had to determine the enforceability of 
a French judgment that found copyright infringe-
ment in France under French law on a subject mat-
ter that was not copyrightable in the U.S. The ques-
tion before the court was whether the fact that the 
object of the infringement was not copyrightable in 
the U.S. made the foreign judgment contrary to U.S. 
public policy. In answer to this question, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit supported 
the view of the district court that copyright is not a 
matter of “strong moral principle”217 but rather rep-
resents “economic legislation based on policy deci-
sions that assign rights based on assessments of what 
legal rules will produce the greatest economic good 
for society as a whole,”218 concluding that “the fact 
that the foreign judgment found copyright infringe-
ment under foreign law on a subject matter that is 
not copyrightable in the US does not make the for-
eign judgment contrary to public policy.”219 
148 In the EU, in the Renault v. Maxicar case,220 Renault 
sought to enforce a French judgment in Italy, in 
which the defendant was found guilty of forgery 
for having manufactured and marketed body parts 
for Renault vehicles. The Italian First Instance Court 
dismissed the application on the ground that the 
French judgment could not be declared enforcea-
ble in Italy because it was contrary to public policy 
in economic matters. The Court of Appeal of Torino 
then decided to stay proceedings and refer the fol-
lowing question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: 
“is a judgment handed down by a court of a Mem-
ber State to be considered contrary to public pol-
icy within the meaning of Article 27 of the Brussels 
Convention if it recognises industrial or intellectual 
property rights over such component parts which 
together make up the bodywork of a car, and affords 
protection to the holder of such purported exclusive 
rights by preventing third parties trading in another 
Member State from manufacturing, selling, trans-
porting, importing or exporting in that Member 
State such component parts which together make 
up the bodywork of a car already on the market, or, 
in any event, by sanctioning such conduct?”221 The 
ECJ answered in the following terms. First the ECJ 
highlighted that “recourse to the clause on public 
policy in Article 27, point 1, of the Convention can be 
envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of 
the judgment delivered in another Contracting State 
would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with 
the legal order of the State in which enforcement is 
sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental prin-
ciple.”222 Second, the ECJ recalled that “the court 
of the State in which enforcement was sought is in 
doubt as to the compatibility with the principles of 
free movement of goods and freedom of competi-
tion of recognition by the court of the State of ori-
gin of the existence of an intellectual property right 
in body parts for cars enabling the holder to prohibit 
traders in another Contracting State from manufac-
turing, selling, transporting, importing or exporting 
such body parts in that Contracting State.”223 Third, 
the ECJ emphasised that “the court of the State in 
which enforcement is sought cannot, without un-
dermining the aim of the Convention, refuse recog-
nition of a decision emanating from another Con-
tracting State solely on the ground that it considers 
that national or Community law was misapplied in 
that decision.”224 Finally, the ECJ concluded that “Ar-
ticle 27, point 1, of the [Brussels] Convention, [now 
34 point 1 of the Brussels I Regulation] […] must be 
interpreted as meaning that a judgment of a court or 
tribunal of a Contracting State recognising the exist-
ence of an intellectual property right in body parts 
for cars, and conferring on the holder of that right 
protection by enabling him to prevent third parties 
trading in another Contracting State from manufac-
turing, selling, transporting, importing or exporting 
in that Contracting State such body parts, cannot be 
considered to be contrary to public policy.”225 
149 In the Brussels system the European Commission 
Proposal to recast the Brussels I Regulation suggests 
that the notion of public policy as a ground for re-
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fusal of recognition should be removed.226 The same 
Proposal was presented by the Commission in the 
framework of the Lugano Convention. However this 
was rejected by the ad hoc working party, who, al-
though acknowledged that the exception was rarely 
used in real life, felt that the public policy rule was 
still necessary as a safeguard for nation States’ fun-
damental interests. However, the requirement that 
the judgment be “manifestly” contrary to public pol-
icy was added. The Pocar Report on the Lugano Con-
vention mentions that the two concepts of substan-
tive public policy and procedural public policy were 
discussed by the ad hoc working party in trying to de-
termine whether the concept of public policy in the 
Convention covered both of them.227
IV.  Discussion
150 The distinction between substantive public policy 
and procedural public policy, as well as the specific 
reference to procedural public policy made by cer-
tain sets of principles like the CLIP Principles and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, which is in 
line with the approach of many international con-
ventions as well as domestic legislation, is to be wel-
comed. The approach followed by only the ALI Prin-
ciples, which specifies the cases where the public 
policy exception can be adopted to deny recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments in the 
rule related to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, seems to be questionable for the 
reasons referred to by the Transparency Proposal. 
Thus, this Proposal avoids listing the cases where the 
public policy exception could lead to the non-recog-
nition and enforcement of the foreign judgment at 
stake, and rather includes some examples in the Pro-
posal’s comments, following the CLIP Principles’ ap-
proach. In any case, it seems sufficient to refuse the 
recourse to the rule on procedural public policy, in 
line with the approach adopted by the CLIP Princi-
ples and the Transparency Proposal, in the case of 
fraud unlike the corresponding rules of the Hague 
Draft Convention, as well as the ALI Principles, which 
contain a ground for non-recognition and enforce-
ment related to fraud in connection with procedure. 
In fact, according to Art. 28.1(c) of the 2001 Hague 
Draft Convention on “grounds for refusal of recogni-
tion or enforcement,” “recognition or enforcement 
of a judgment may be refused [only] if – […]  [c) the 
[judgment results from] proceedings [in the State of 
origin were] incompatible with fundamental princi-
ples of procedure of the State addressed, [including 
the right of each party to be heard by an impartial 
and independent court];].” Furthermore, accord-
ing to Art. 28.1(f), “recognition or enforcement of 
a judgment may be refused [only] if – […] recogni-
tion or enforcement would be manifestly incompat-
ible with the public policy of the State addressed.” 
Thus, the Hague Draft Convention distinguishes be-
tween procedural public policy (Art.28.1.c) and sub-
stantive public policy (Art.28.1.f), following the re-
cent tendency to include specific reference to both 
kinds of public policy. 
151 The intent of all sets of principles to describe a nar-
row category of cases, as well as the expression of 
this intent in the wording of the ALI Principles and 
Comments, the CLIP Principles, and the Transpar-
ency Proposal is to be welcomed. In contrast, the 
wording of the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
and its related Comments does not seem to suffi-
ciently express this intent. 
152 With respect to the different specifications of the 
public policy grounds mentioned by the commen-
taries to the relevant principles and by the literature 
related to them, it is to be noted that even though 
differences exist between them, this does not mean 
that the sets of principles involved necessarily lead 
to different results. In fact, each commentary to the 
sets of principles under examination makes it clear 
that the specifications provided are only examples 
and do not mean to be exhaustive. Therefore, even 
if a ground of non-recognition is not found in the 
specifications with regard to one set of principles 
that is present in another set, the same ground could 
still be adopted by the former set of principles and 
therefore reach the same result. Under this prem-
ise, it seems important at this point to just refer to 
paragraph (M.I.) where an analysis is made of what 
appears to lead to different results and the reasons 
for that. With respect to the adoption of the public 
policy exception in relation to validity see also the 
validity relevant paragraphs (I.).  
N. Non-compensatory damages
I.  Differences
153 The ALI principles, the CLIP Principles and the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal introduce a specific 
ground for non-recognition of money judgments on 
non-compensatory damages. In contrast, the Trans-
parency Proposal does not provide for such a rule. 
However, the result is the same because the Trans-
parency Proposal invokes the possibility of adopting 
the public policy exception in relation to punitive 
damages. Yet, as mentioned above, the Transparency 
Proposal does not foresee that punitive damages will 
always be contrary to public policy.228 Instead, it ad-
vocates resolving the issue on a flexible basis, scru-
tinizing the foreign judgment according to a case-
by-case approach, by stating that “whether foreign 
damages awards are punitive and shall not be recog-
nized or enforced depends upon the particular facts 
of the cases concerned, and is to be determined by 
the requested court.”229 In addition, Section 411 of 
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the ALI Principles and the literature commenting on 
the CLIP Principles require a comparison of both the 
function and the amount of the sums awarded, mak-
ing significant to that comparison amounts aimed 
at covering costs and expenses relating to the pro-
ceedings, attorneys fees and liquidated damages.230 
Finally, the commentaries to the ALI Principles ex-
plicitly acknowledge the need to recognize and en-
force reasonable royalties.231
II.  Rationale 
154 The rules on non-compensatory damages of the sets 
of principles at stake are all based on the same ra-
tionale of facilitating the (partial) recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments awarding puni-
tive damages despite the differences related to the 
“principles on the purposes and functions of the lia-
bility system.”232 In fact, “this approach reflects the 
trend to assume that refusal to recognize judgments 
imposing punitive damages is mainly a reaction 
against the excessive amount of money awarded.”233 
Those rules are “modelled”234 on Art. 33 of the Hague 
Draft, which, however, includes certain specifica-
tions on the debtor’s role before the court, as well 
as on the impossibility of the requested court reduc-
ing the damages awarded beyond the sum that would 
have been imposed by it in the same circumstances 
of the case. Article 33 of this Draft Convention is out-
lined in more detail in paragraph N.IV. below. 
III.  International Context
155 In the international context, a tendency to favor 
the (partial) recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments awarding non-compensatory dam-
ages is expressed by Art. 11 of the Hague Convention 
of Choice of Forum, which is modelled on Art. 33 of 
the Hague Draft Convention.  
156 In the EU the same tendency is established by the 
Rome II Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contrac-
tual obligations (Rome II)). In fact, under Art. 15(c) 
the applicable law to the IPR infringement deter-
mines also “(c) the existence, the nature and the as-
sessment of damage or the remedy claimed.” Yet, 
Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation establishes that 
“Considerations of public interest justify giving the 
courts of the Member States the possibility, in excep-
tional circumstances, of applying exceptions based 
on public policy and overriding mandatory provi-
sions. In particular, the application of a provision of 
the law designated by this Regulation which would 
have the effect of causing non-compensatory exem-
plary or punitive damages of an excessive nature to 
be awarded may, depending on the circumstances 
of the case and the legal order of the Member State 
of the court seised, be regarded as being contrary to 
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.” Thus, 
the requested court can exercise discretional eval-
uation just to reduce the amount of the damages 
awarded.235
157 At the national level, courts in several states that 
do not impose punitive damages have found recog-
nition and enforcement of such decisions to be con-
trary to public policy, refusing to recognise entirely 
the judgment at stake. This approach was followed 
for instance in Italy by the Supreme Court in 2007.236 
However, this approach is criticised by the view that 
invokes a less restrictive approach with regard to 
public policy and aims to restrict the non-recogni-
tion of the judgment imposing punitive damages to 
the amount of compensatory damages.237 A trend 
can be identified in this respect to (partially) recog-
nise and enforce foreign judgments imposing puni-
tive damages,238 as is demonstrated by the relevant 
Supreme Court decision in Japan.239 In other civil 
law systems even more favourable results have been 
reached. For example, in Spain, the Supreme Court 
declared a U.S. judgment enforceable that awarded 
punitive damages in a dispute involving the infringe-
ment of IP rights.240 
IV.  Discussion
158 The rules of the ALI principles, the CLIP Principles 
and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal that 
introducea specific ground for non-recognition of 
monetary judgments on non-compensatory dam-
ages, with the aim of facilitating the partial recog-
nition of those judgments, are to be welcomed. The 
Transparency Proposal’s understanding of punitive 
damages as being eventually included in the public 
policy exception leads to the same result. Thus, those 
rules are in line with the international tendency to 
favou the (partial) recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments imposing punitive damages 
that is well-expressed by the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreement and by the Hague Draft 
Convention. The Hague Draft Convention states in 
Article 33: “1. A judgment which awards non-com-
pensatory damages, including exemplary or punitive 
damages, shall be recognised and enforced to the ex-
tent that a court in the State addressed could have 
awarded similar or comparable damages. Nothing 
in this paragraph shall preclude the court addressed 
from recognising and enforcing the judgment under 
its law for an amount up to the full amount of the 
damages awarded by the court of origin. 2. a) Where 
the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor 
has the opportunity to be heard, satisfies the court 
addressed that in the circumstances, including those 
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existing in the State of origin, grossly excessive dam-
ages have been awarded, recognition and enforce-
ment may be limited to a lesser amount. b) In no 
event shall the court addressed recognise or enforce 
the judgment in an amount less than that which 
could have been awarded in the State addressed 
in the same circumstances, including those exist-
ing in the State of origin. 3. In applying paragraph 
1 or 2, the court addressed shall take into account 
whether and to what extent the damages awarded 
by the court of origin serve to cover costs and ex-
penses relating to the proceedings.” This rule favors 
the (partial) recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments awarding punitive damages, which is in 
line with the current international trend.241 The Re-
port to the Hague Convention makes it clear that Ar-
ticle 33(1) was intended to exclude reliance by States 
on any public policy objection they may have raised 
to enforce punitive damages.242 The same report ex-
plains how the effect of paragraph 2(a) is to be lim-
ited, using the example of a “woman who receives 
several millions of dollars for being scalded by hot 
coffee” to show what is meant by “grossly excessive 
damages.”243 Furthermore, the report states that as-
sessing what is “grossly excessive” is to be done by 
comparing the award given to the norm in similar 
cases in the State of origin – comparing the award 
to the norm in the State addressed is not enough on 
its own.244 The rule of the Hague Draft Convention at 
stake goes even further in that paragraph two speci-
fies the role of the debtor in proving to the court the 
excessive nature of the damages awarded as well as 
clarifying that the requested court shall not recog-
nize or enforce the judgment in an amount less than 
that which could have been awarded in the State ad-
dressed in the same circumstances.245 
159 Unlike the Hague Draft Convention, all sets of Prin-
ciples do not refer either to the role of the debtor in 
proving before the court the excessive nature of the 
damages awarded, or to the fact that the requested 
court shall not recognize or enforce the judgment 
in an amount less than that which could have been 
awarded in the requested State in the same circum-
stances. The high standard of clarity provided by 
the literature commenting on the CLIP Principles 
and the ALI Principles’ commentaries in relation to 
how to compare the amount of damages awarded 
by the rendering court to the ones that would have 
been imposed by the requested court is to be wel-
comed. The same results could also be reached un-
der the Transparency Proposal and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal, recalling the need to scruti-
nize the foreign judgment according to a case-by-
case approach. 
O. Other grounds for non-recognition 
of foreign judgments
I. Differences
160 Each set of principles enumerates exhaustively the 
other grounds for non-recognition so that no other 
checks may be used to control recognition of for-
eign judgments.246 
161 The CLIP Principles, the ALI Principles, the Trans-
parency Proposal, and the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal all raise the failure to provide timely and 
lawful service/notice as a basis for non-recognition 
of judgments. Yet, the adoption of the words “ser-
vice” or “notice” could be avoided as they are in the 
Hague Draft Convention, which uses the word “no-
tify.”247 Certain differences among the sets of Prin-
ciples concern whether this ground for non-recogni-
tion applies when the defendant is improperly served 
but still appears in court. Under the CLIP Principles, 
improper service cannot serve as a basis for non-rec-
ognition in “situations in which the defendant en-
tered an appearance and presented his case without 
contesting notification in the court of origin, pro-
vided that the law of the state of origin permitted 
notification to be contested.”248  Under the Trans-
parency Proposal, a judgment shall be recognized 
even if the defendant did not receive proper service 
if, inter alia, the defendant “appeared in the action 
without receiving such service” (Article 402(ii)). Un-
like the CLIP Principles, there is no mention of such 
a requirement. As for the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal, while the Comments note that “the Article 
clarifies that the defendant’s appearance does not le-
gitimate the non-compliance with the formality,”249 
the text of the Article provides that improper service 
as a ground for non-recognition shall not apply “if 
the defendant has appeared without receiving such 
timely service” (Article 401(1)(ii)).  Furthermore, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal clarifies that 
service by publication or any other service similar 
thereto is excluded (Article 401(ii)). By contrast, the 
ALI Principles seem to provide an even broader basis 
for non-recognition than the corresponding rules of 
the CLIP Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
with respect to the ground for non-recognition re-
lated to “notice,” because the ALI Principles appear 
to allow for non-recognition when there was im-
proper service even when the defendant appeared 
and did not contest service.250 The ALI Principles’ 
approach is not in line with the solution adopted by 
the Hague Draft Convention.251 
162 Another difference concerns service that is sufficient 
to ensure protection of the defendant’s rights, but 
is not in compliance with international conventions 
2012 
Benedetta Ubertazzi
330 1
binding upon the states involved. The CLIP Principles 
and the ALI Principles reflect one approach, requir-
ing only that the defendant receive notice in time 
sufficient to respond to the suit, but do not explicitly 
require that the service be made in compliance with 
binding conventions252 and even state that, “pro-
cess serving not undertaken in accordance with a 
treaty on judicial cooperation to which the coun-
try of origin and the enforcing country are parties 
does not necessarily make recognition contrary to 
Article 4:501(1)/”253 By contrast, the Transparency 
Proposal provides, consistent with the Hague Draft 
Convention as will be discussed in paragraph O.IV., 
that if there is a treaty between the country of judg-
ment and Japan that provides that the service of the 
document required for the commencement of litiga-
tion must be effected in a certain manner, service 
must comply with the requirements of the treaty or 
it will not be regarded as timely and lawfully made. 
Yet the results of both approaches seem to be the 
same since the commentary to the Transparency 
Proposal recognizes that service that was not com-
pliant with international conventions or was insuffi-
cient to protect the defendant’s rights cannot serve 
as a basis for non-recognition if the defendant ap-
peared in the foreign proceedings.254 Furthermore, 
the literature commenting on the CLIP Principles 
states that “at any rate, from the practical perspec-
tive, it seems reasonable to advise any party who 
may be interested in the future enforcement of the 
judgment abroad to ensure that service is through 
a method admitted in the future requested state, 
to avoid possible risks of non-recognition given the 
current state of the law in many countries.”
163 Finally, none of the sets of Principles examined in-
clude a provision like Article 9(c)(ii) of Hague Con-
vention on Choice of Court, which refers to an addi-
tional ground for non-recognition as the situation in 
which notification to the defendant in the requested 
State was made “in a manner that is incompatible 
with fundamental principles of the requested State 
concerning service of documents.” Hence, those situ-
ations are covered by the procedural-specific rules of 
the ALI principles as well as by the procedural pub-
lic policy provisions of the other sets of Principles.255 
164 All sets of Principles establish as a ground for 
non-recognition the pending of proceedings as well 
as the inconsistency between judgments in terms 
closely related to their specific coordination of ju-
risdiction principles. With respect to those grounds 
for non-recognition in relation to the validity issue 
see the validity relevant paragraphs (I.). 
165 Therefore, a first ground for non-recognition in this 
respect is related to the pending of proceedings. In 
fact, the CLIP Principles provide a chronological cri-
terion, like the Hague Draft Convention (see para-
graph O.IV.), and establish that  a foreign judgment 
shall not be recognized if proceedings between the 
same parties that have the same cause of action are 
pending before a court of the requested state, pro-
vided that those proceedings were the first to be in-
stituted, even if the proceeding did not come to a 
judgment by the time the foreign judgment was re-
quired to be recognized an enforced (otherwise the 
rules on the irreconcilability of judgments hereaf-
ter mentioned should prevail).256 The Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal’s relevant rule is modelled on 
the CLIP Principles’ corresponding provision.257 The 
ALI Principles adopt the same chronological crite-
rion but do not limit it to the forum state proceed-
ing. Instead, they  extend it to whatever previously 
pending proceeding is in the non-rendering states, 
when the previously seized court has jurisdiction 
according to the relevant jurisdiction rules or when 
this court coordinates or cooperates in the adjudi-
cation or in the consolidation court. By contrast, the 
Transparency Proposal provides that the Japanese 
proceeding always prevails over the foreign judge-
ment in terms of recognition in Japan, thus allowing 
for non-recognition even if the proceeding in the re-
quested State (e.g., the Japanese proceeding) starts 
after the proceeding that led to the judgment to be 
recognised, even if the Japanese proceeding did not 
come to a judgment by the time the foreign judg-
ment was required to be recognised and enforced. 
The Transparency Proposal does not pose the re-
quirement of same parties and same subject matter 
but just adopts the notion of “parallel litigation,” 
leaving its characterisation in relation to the con-
crete case to the court requested in light of the rel-
evant jurisdiction rules. 
166 A second ground for non-recognition in this respect 
is based on the “irreconcilability” of judgments. The 
CLIP Principles establish that a foreign judgment 
cannot be recognised if it is irreconcilable with an-
other judgment given by the requested State’s court 
of between the same parties, or given between the 
same parties and having the same cause of action 
by a third State’s court earlier or already recognised 
by the requested court. Thus, with respect to the in-
consistency of the judgment to be recognised with 
another judgment rendered in a third State’s court, 
the CLIP Principles pose either a priority criterion or 
a requirement related to the same cause of actions 
of both judgments involved, whereas those two re-
quirements are absent with regard to the irreconcil-
ability of the rendered judgment with the one given 
in the requested State. The Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal’s relevant rule is modelled on the CLIP 
Principle’s corresponding provision.258  The ALI Prin-
ciples do not pose a priority requirement but rather 
impose the same cause of action for any case related 
to the irreconcilability of judgments, allowing rec-
ognition to be refused when the foreign judgment 
at stake is irreconcilable with a judgment rendered 
by the forum state’s courts, or even by third states 
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that had jurisdiction according to the relevant rules 
or were had coordinated or cooperated in the adju-
dication or in the consolidation court. In any case, 
the CLIP Principles specify the strict understanding 
of the same parties requirement, and the irreconcil-
ability of judgments requirement. and the fact that 
the CLIP Principles leave to the requested court the 
decision as to whether the judgment given in the 
rendered State has to have become res judicata or if 
it is sufficient for the judgment to be final and con-
clusive at that stage of procedure.259 Once again the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal’s relevant rule is 
modelled on the CLIP Principle’s corresponding pro-
vision.260  In contrast,  Article 402(v) of the Trans-
parency Proposal regulates “a situation where, if the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment 
is sought, there already exists a Japanese judgment 
incompatible with that foreign judgment which did 
not result from international parallel litigation. In 
this situation, the Japanese judgment should have 
priority over the foreign judgment if the former 
had become final and binding earlier than the latter 
had.” Thus, the Transparency Proposal does not pose 
any requirement related to the same subject-matter 
and the same parties, but refers only to the notion 
of “incompatibility,” leaving its characterisation in 
relation to the concrete case to the court requested 
in light of the relevant jurisdiction rules. Further-
more, the Proposal does not refer to the inconsist-
ency of the judgment to be recognised with another 
judgment given in a third country eventually rec-
ognised in the requested State. Also, the Transpar-
ency Proposal requires explicitly that the Japanese 
judgment  become final and binding to allow for the 
non-recognition of the foreign judgment at stake. 
Yet, even though this rule seems to be stricter than 
the corresponding ones of the other sets of Princi-
ples, which do not require the finality of the judg-
ments of the forum State or third States, the result 
in this respect could still be the same because the 
rendered judgment to be recognised cannot be rec-
ognised whenever a Japanese proceeding is pending 
in Japan, irrespective of any chronological criterion. 
Thus, even if the pending Japanese proceeding is still 
in the first instance phase, the requested judgment 
cannot be recognised. 
II.  Rationale 
167 The ground for non-recognition related to the timely 
and lawful service is posed by all sets of Principles 
to ensure the protection of the defendant during 
the proceeding. This ground for non-recognition is 
therefore “based on an understanding of the impor-
tance of procedural fairness that finds expression in 
the requirement for notice of the commencement of 
the suit to the defendant as a core of the system of 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments.”261 Furthermore, the Transparency Proposal 
commentary clarifies that the rule related to service 
incorporates the Supreme Court of Japan’s interpre-
tation of the corresponding rule of the Japanese Code 
of Civil Procedure.262 As for the differences between 
the sets of principles with respect to methods of ser-
vice, as already noted they do not lead to different 
results since each of the principles involved, save 
for the ALI Principles which is not so clear on the 
point, focuses on the verification that the defend-
ant was notified and received knowledge of the pro-
ceedings in a way that did not hinder his right of de-
fense, and therefore had the opportunity to defend 
himself.263 Yet, the commentaries to the Transpar-
ency Proposal clarify that “the functions of giving 
notice and creating defense possibilities, which the 
service must fulfil under this provision, could be re-
quired through interpretation of the term ‘service.’ 
However interpretation does not always lead to the 
requirement of complying with the applicable con-
ventions. Thus, the Transparency Proposal, from the 
viewpoint of stressing the significance of interna-
tional judicial assistance conventions and ensuring 
the stability of the procedure, provides for the re-
quirement for the compliance with such conventions 
in Article 402(ii).”264
168 All sets of principles establish the pending of pro-
ceedings as well as the inconsistency between judg-
ments in terms closely related to their specific coor-
dination principles as a ground for non-recognition. 
The reasoning for those grounds is well-explained by 
the Comments to the ALI Principles: “in order to pro-
mote efficient adjudication, it is important not only 
to facilitate parties’ applications to coordinate, but 
also to discourage continued proceedings in other 
fora once an action has been coordinated. An effec-
tive way to discourage those proceedings is to deny 
enforcement to any resulting judgment.”265 
169 The approach adopted by the CLIP Principles, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal and ALI Princi-
ples in relation to the pending of proceedings un-
der which a chronological criterion is established 
is grounded on its being in line with the view follo-
wed by many international conventions and instru-
ments.266 Yet, the absence of any chronological cri-
terion in the Transparency Proposal, which always 
grants prevalence to the proceedings in Japan, is ex-
plained in this way: “giving priority to the Japanese 
proceedings and the Japanese judgment in the future 
is logically consistent, because, in this case, Japa-
nese courts would justify the exercise of jurisdiction 
as the place of performance of the primary obliga-
tion or the place of occurrence of the primary facts 
adopted by Article 201 (1)(2), i.e. the ‘the proper fo-
rum approach.’ Thus the foreign judgment is not to 
be recognized or enforced, even if it has been ren-
dered or has become final and binding earlier than 
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the existing or future Japanese judgment has. Article 
402(iv) clarifies that purpose.”267
170 The approach adopted by the CLIP Principles, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal and ALI Princip-
les with regard to the irreconcilability of judgments 
(though maintaining some differences) is grounded 
on the fact that it “reflects criteria that have achie-
ved significant acceptance from a comparative per-
spective.268 The commentaries to the Transparency 
Proposal make it clear that their approach aims at 
“protecting the domestic legal order.”269
171 Finally, with respect to those grounds for non-reco-
gnition in relation to the validity issue, see the vali-
dity relevant paras.
III.  International Context
172 At the international level an exhaustive list of 
grounds of refusal “is common in the drafting of in-
ternational conventions concerning the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments, as illustrated by the 
approach followed in the” Hague Draft Convention. 
173 With respect to the ground for non-recognition re-
lated to services, at the international level, rules im-
posing the control of the defendant’s rights of de-
fense by proper service in adequate time before the 
court of origin are posed e.g., by Article 9(c)(i) Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 2005, 
Section 4(c)(1) Uniform Foreign-Country Money 
Judgments Recognition Act (2005) and Art.28(1)(d) 
of the Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction, which 
will be discussed in paragraph O.IV.270 At the EU/
EFTA level, rules imposing the control of the rights of 
defense of the (defaulting) defendant by proper ser-
vice in adequate time before the court of origin are 
posed by Art. 34.2 of the Brussels I Regulation and of 
the Lugano Convention. In light of the relevant ECJ 
jurisprudence, the Pocar Report to the Lugano Con-
vention discusses how the ad hoc working party saw 
the need to balance the protection of the defendant 
(through the requirements of the document being 
“duly” served, and the defendant having “sufficient 
time to enable him to arrange for his defence,” pres-
ent in the 1988 Convention), against the possibility of 
the defendant abusing the provision and relying on 
“insignificant irregularities of service” to frustrate 
the recognition and enforcement procedure.271 This 
led to Article 34(2) dropping the requirement of ser-
vice being in due form. Instead, this issue was con-
sidered in combination with the issue of giving the 
defendant “sufficient time to enable him to arrange 
for his defence.”272 Furthermore, even if the service 
did not give the defendant sufficient time to prepare 
his defense, the judgment is still to be enforced if the 
defendant did not challenge the service in the State 
of origin when it was possible for him to do so.273 At 
the national level, rules controlling the rights of the 
defendant before the court of origin (namely requir-
ing proper summons and giving sufficient time) are 
established by many legal systems such as 64.b) Ital-
ian Act of Private International Law of 1995.
174 With respect to the ground for non-recognition re-
lated to parallel litigation “many international con-
ventions on recognition and enforcement as well as 
national legislations follow [the] approach”274 taken 
by the CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and Jap-
anese Proposal particularly. Yet, in Japan Article 
118 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 24 of 
the Civil Execution Act contain no provision to deal 
with international parallel litigation. The relevant 
jurisprudence adopted the public policy exception 
in certain occasions to deal with those issues. The 
literature is divided on the point.275  In contrast, at 
the EU/EFTA level, a pending proceedings rule that 
says that at the recognition and enforcement stage, 
the proceeding of the court first seized shall prevail 
against judgments given by courts at later stages 
(save when the requested court’s proceedings that 
were however later seized had come to a judgment 
at the time when recognition was sought) is lacking 
in the Brussels system. This is so because the lis pen-
dens rule provided for by Article 27 Brussels I Regu-
lation should prevent such proceedings from devel-
oping in parallel. 
175 With respect to the ground for non-recognition re-
lated to irreconcilability of judgments many interna-
tional conventions on recognition and enforcement 
as well as national legislations follow the view of the 
CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and Japanese 
Proposal particularly, which is also adopted by Art. 
34(3) and (4) of the Brussels system.276 Particularly, 
the Pocar Report to the Lugano Convention clari-
fies that the ground for non-recognition of irrecon-
cilability between judgments will apply only rarely. 
However, it does have a broad scope, and thus  two 
judgments can be held as irreconcilable where they 
only have the same parties to the action, not the 
same subject matter.277 
176 At the national level, different approaches can be 
found in national systems regarding the status of the 
judgment given by the Court of origin, and whether 
it has to be res judicata or if it can simply be “final 
and conclusive” regarding that stage of the proce-
dure. In Italy for instance, the Italian judgment that 
can preclude the recognition and enforcement of 
the foreign judgment at stake has to have become 
res judicata. In Japan, Article 118 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act 
contain no provision to deal with the existence of an 
incompatible Japanese judgment. The relevant juris-
prudence adopted the public policy exception in cer-
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tain occasions to deal with those issues. The litera-
ture is divided on the point.278  
177 With respect to those grounds for non-recognition 
in relation to the validity issue, see the validity par-
agraph (I).
IV.  Discussion
178 Each sets of Principles enumerates exhaustively the 
other grounds for non-recognition so that no other 
checks may be used to control recognition of foreign 
judgments.279 This approach is in line with the Hague 
Draft Convention, which in Art. 28 on the “grounds 
for refusal of recognition and enforcement” adopts 
the wording “only.”  The Hague Draft Convention 
adopts an exhaustive list of grounds of refusal as Art. 
28 on “Grounds for refusal of recognition or enforce-
ment” establishes that “recognition or enforcement 
of a judgment may be refused [only] if.” Therefore, as 
the Report to the Hague Draft Convention highlights, 
while the list is exhaustive, courts have discretion as 
to whether they actually refuse recognition or en-
forcement when a grounds of refusal exists.280
179 With respect to the ground for non-recognition re-
lated to services, the ALI Principles’ approach  is to 
be understood as too broad in that it does not re-
strict the operating of this ground to default judg-
ments or to judgments when the defendant appears 
in order to contest service, but it also covers cases 
where the defendant appears and does not contest 
service. Yet the approach adopted by all other sets 
of Principles is more in line with Art. 28(1)(d) of the 
Hague Draft Convention, which highlights that the 
non-recognition ground at stake applies “unless the 
defendant entered an appearance and presented his 
case without contesting the matter of notification 
in the court of origin.” In any case this Article re-
quires that the two requirements of notification to 
the defendant of the document instituting proceed-
ings  and the allowance  of sufficient time to arrange 
for a defense must be fulfilled; otherwise the judg-
ment may be denied recognition and enforcement. 
Finally, on a terminology note the adoption of the 
words “service” or “notice” is contrary to the re-
sult of the Hague Draft Convention, which uses the 
word “notified” instead, as “notify” has no techni-
cal meaning in English legal terms in order to avoid 
references to national law.281
180 With respect to the pending of proceedings and the 
inconsistency of judgments requirements, the ab-
sence of references to the inconsistencies with third 
countries’ judgments in the Transparency Proposal, 
as well as the too broad prevalence conferred by the 
Transparency Proposal to Japanese proceedings ac-
cording to which the foreign judgment is not to be 
recognized or enforced, even if it has been rendered 
or has become final and binding earlier than the ex-
isting or future Japanese judgment has, is subject 
to criticism. In both aspects the Transparency Pro-
posal is not in line with the Hague Draft Convention, 
which adopts an approach similar to the CLIP Princi-
ples and Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, listing 
among the other grounds for refusal of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments the follow-
ing: “a) proceedings between the same parties and 
having the same subject matter are pending before 
a court of the State addressed, if first seised in ac-
cordance with Article 21; b) the judgment is incon-
sistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State 
addressed or in another State, provided that in the 
latter case the judgment is capable of being recog-
nised or enforced in the State addressed.” Further-
more, the Transparency Proposal approach may lead 
to dangerous results. Thus, similarly to what hap-
pened for instance in Italy in the frame of the previ-
ous PIL system, this rule can gave rise to many abuses 
and sharp practices given that parties in a foreign 
proceeding in the finalizing or finalized stage can 
start proceedings in Japan as soon as they are aware 
of the fact that their counterparties are in the pro-
cess of asking for the recognition and enforcement 
of the foreign judgment in a Japanese court. In this 
way the recently instituted Japanese proceeding can 
prevent the recognition and enforcement of the for-
eign judgment at stake. It is to be welcomed the lit-
erature commenting on the fact that the CLIP Prin-
ciples leave to the requested court the decision as to 
whether the judgment given in the State addressed 
needs to have become res judicata or if it is sufficient 
for the judgment to have become final and conclu-
sive at that stage of the procedure. 
181 Finally, with respect to the inconsistencies of the 
judgment to be recognized with another judgment 
rendered in the requested State, the CLIP Principles’ 
absence of clarification as to why they do not pose 
either a priority criterion or a requirement related 
to the same cause of actions of both judgments in-
volved is subject to criticism, whereas for instance 
in the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal the “same 
cause of action” is posed as an additional require-
ment to deny recognition of the foreign judgment. 
Yet, it seems that an explanation for the CLIP Princi-
ples approach can be inferred from the Hague Draft 
Convention Report according to which, “the quality 
of being inconsistent should not be confused with 
lis alibi pendens. A lis pendens situation can lead to 
compatible results: the main problem there is the 
duplication of time, effort and money. Inconsistent 
judgments, on the other hand, can result from causes 
of action in respect of subject matters which are dif-
ferent and may even arise when the parties are dif-
ferent as when one judgment condemns a guaran-
tor to pay for a debt that as between the creditor and 
principal debtor has been annulled in another judg-
ment. Nor is preference necessarily given to the in-
consistent judgment which is prior in time or which 
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results from proceedings which are instituted prior 
in time.”282 This is in line with the Brussels system 
understanding mentioned at the corresponding par-
agraph O.III. Therefore, the CLIP approach in this 
respect should be favored and even extended to in-
consistent judgments of third states. On the irrecon-
cilability of judgments with regard to the validity is-
sue, this was already referred to in the paragraphs 
related to validity (I.) and to public policy (M.). 
182 Finally, on a terminology note the Hague Draft Con-
vention on Jurisdiction adopts the notion of “in-
consistency” in line with the ALI Principles and the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal, rather than “in-
compatibility” (Transparency Proposal) or “irrec-
oncilability” (CLIP Principles). In fact, “in the Eng-
lish version the word ‘inconsistent’ was preferred 
to ‘irreconcilable’  as a counterpart to the French 
‘inconciliable.’”283  
P. Exclusion of substantive review
I.  Differences
183 The CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal explicitly prohibit substantive review 
of the merits of a case when determining whether 
to enforce a foreign judgment. Therefore, “consid-
eration of the merits of foreign judgments is lim-
ited to the verification of the grounds for non-rec-
ognition, especially to ensure it does not infringe 
public policy.”284 The commentary to the Transpar-
ency Proposal clarifies that “the Transparency Pro-
posal still maintains and is based on some funda-
mental principles prerequisite for Article 118 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure and Article 24 of the Civil 
Execution Act. They are as follows: (i) no review of 
the merits of the foreign judgments or the prohibi-
tion of review of their merits for recognition (the 
prevailing interpretation) and enforcement (Art. 
24(2) of the Civil Execution Act) […]. Although [the 
Transparency Proposal] includes no provisions set-
ting forth these principles, it presupposes them as 
a matter of course.” 285 This approach is in line with 
the approach taken by the 2001 Hague Draft Con-
vention, in Article 28(2), which is outlined below in 
paragraph P.IV. The ALI Principles is silent on the 
point,286 whereas their Section 403(4) impedes the 
requested court from reviewing “the facts found by 
the rendering State and the governing law.” On the 
finding of facts issue see, however, above at para-
graph J.I.
II.  Rationale 
184 The CLIP Principles prohibit substantive review of 
a foreign judgment in Article 4:601, which is a “cri-
terion [that] is common to almost all international, 
regional, and national systems of recognition and 
enforcement, since it results from the separation 
of judicial systems and the essence of recognition 
and enforcement.”287 The same rationale is adopted 
by the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal (in Ar-
ticle 401(2)) in support of its corresponding provi-
sions.288 The commentary to the Transparency Pro-
posal recalls the relevant Japanese internal rule in 
this respect. 
III.  International Context
185 “This criterion is common to almost all interna-
tional, regional, and national systems of recognition 
and enforcement, since it results from the separa-
tion of judicial systems and the essence of recogni-
tion and enforcement.”289 At the EU level the ex-
clusion of substantive review is established by Arts. 
36 and 45.2 of the Brussels I Regulation and 2007 of 
the Lugano Convention. The same exclusion is pro-
vided for by the Hague Draft Convention, as will be 
discussed in paragraph P.IV.
IV.  Discussion
186 The approach taken by the CLIP Principles, Trans-
parency Proposal and Joint Korean and Japanese Pro-
posal is to be welcomed because i.e. it is in line with 
the scope of the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments as well as with the international ten-
dency in this field. In contrast, the ALI Principles’ 
silence on the point is regrettable. In fact, despite 
the fact that those Principles provide for the rule on 
the finding of facts, they do not seem to reach with 
this rule the same results as the provisions here ad-
dressed. The absence of a clear rule in this respect 
in the Transparency Proposal could be an issue for 
those who might not be aware of its relevant com-
mentary recalling the exclusion at stake as a general 
grounding principle of the Proposal.290 
187 Additionally, the reference by the literature com-
menting on CLIP Principles to certain substantive 
review that can be rendered under the public pol-
icy exception is to be welcomed. Yet, even in the 
absence of such referral the other sets of Principles 
lead to the same result. The Hague Draft Conven-
tion’s relevant rule, Art. 28(2), states that “without 
prejudice to such review as is necessary for the pur-
pose of application of the provisions of this Chapter, 
there shall be no review of the merits of the judg-
ment rendered by the court of origin.” The Report 
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to this Draft Convention clarifies that a substantive 
review is necessary to verify the jurisdiction of the 
rendering court; that the judgment was not obtained 
by fraud and that it does not conflict with the public 
policy exception; and to reconsider the damages in 
cases of punitive damages.291 As mentioned it seems 
that all sets of Principles lead to the same results by 
way of interpretation.  
Q. General principles related 
to the procedure
I. Differences
188 The ALI Principles and the Transparency Proposal 
lack rules on the general principles related to the 
procedures unlike the CLIP Principles (at Article 
4:701) and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
(at Article 409(2)). Yet, as the Joint Korean and Japa-
nese Proposal’s commentary clarifies “because these 
expectations are self-evident, an independent provi-
sion in the [principles] is not be a must. That’s why 
it does not appear in the Transparency Proposal. How-
ever, because it is universally accepted as a model 
rule in conflict of laws, we’ve written it into these 
Principles to reconfirm it with certainty.”292 In other 
words, even in the absence of specific rules on the 
point it is clear that recognition and enforcement 
procedures shall not be unnecessarily complicated 
or costly, or entail unreasonable time limits or un-
warranted delays. This result derives i.e. from “the 
general obligations imposed by Article 41(2) TRIPS 
Agreement.”293
II.  Rationale 
189 The relevant CLIP Principles and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal rules are in line with the 
“general obligation” imposed on member States by 
Article 41(2) TRIPS Agreement.294 Furthermore, the 
Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal provides a ra-
tionale for the absence of such a provision in the 
Transparency Proposal, stating that the result to 
which this proposal leads to are self-evident by way 
of interpretation.295 
III.  International Context
190 At the international level Article 41(2) TRIPS Agree-
ment obliges States to act in an expeditious way 
when dealing with domestic IPRs enforcement is-
sues. At the recognition and enforcement level, cer-
tain provisions of international conventions impose 
on contracting states an obligation to use in the field 
of the convention concerned the most rapid proce-
dure established in the requested State and, if nec-
essary, to speed up existing procedures. A similar 
provision may be found in Art. 30 of the Hague Draft 
Convention, which will be referred to in paragraph 
Q.IV. In the EU/EFTA system the Pocar Report on the 
Lugano Convention rule related to the enforcement 
of foreign judgments (Art. 43) states that although 
the review of whether there are any grounds to re-
ject the application for enforceability may take some 
time, the “free movement of judgments should not 
be hindered by obstacles such as delays in proceed-
ings for enforcement.”296
IV.  Discussion
191 Even in the absence of a specific provision on the 
point, all Principles lead to the same result of mak-
ing the requested court act expeditiously, as explic-
itly established by the CLIP Principles, and in a sim-
pler way, by the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal. 
Furthermore, the 2001 Hague Draft Convention sup-
ports the approach taken by the Joint Korean and 
Japanese Proposal and the CLIP Principles by saying 
in Art. 30 that “the court addressed shall act [in ac-
cordance with the most rapid procedure available 
under local law] [expeditiously].” The Report to this 
Convention also states that where it is appropriate, 
Article 30 may require courts to speed up existing 
procedures, obliging member States “to use, for the 
purposes of recognition, declarations of enforceabil-
ity and enforcement the most rapid procedure they 
possess in their national law and, where appropri-
ate to speed up existing procedures.”297 
R. Recognition and 
enforcement procedures
I.  Differences
192 The CLIP Principles (at Articles 4:702 and 4:703) and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal (at Article 
409(1)) refer to the law of the requested State to rule 
the recognition and enforcement procedures. How-
ever, the rules of the CLIP Principles are much more 
specific on the point. In fact, the CLIP Principles ren-
der it clear that the recognition of foreign judgments 
shall be rendered without any special procedure, 
e.g. automatic recognition. Yet, the literature com-
menting on the CLIP Principles acknowledges that 
in specific cases a party may want to obtain a formal 
declaration of recognition or non-recognition and 
that “litigation in one country of activities carried 
out through ubiquitous media makes this possibility 
more significant than ever before.”298 As an example 
this literature refers to the case where a party de-
2012 
Benedetta Ubertazzi
336 1
feated in a foreign country is interested in obtaining 
a decision declaring that the foreign judgment can-
not be recognized or enforced in the forum state, as 
happened in the Yahoo! Inc. and La Ligue contre le rac-
isme et l’antisémitisme cases, although the case was 
not concerned with the exploitation of IP rights.299 
As far as the enforcement of foreign judgments is 
concerned the CLIP Principles and their commenting 
literature clarify that “the possibility of enforcing a 
foreign judgment follows from the declaration of en-
forceability (recognition) of the relevant judgment. 
The basic criterion is that once the foreign judgment 
becomes enforceable in the requested state it has to 
be treated as a judgment of the requested state and 
hence the law of the enforcing country applies to the 
execution process.”300 Yet, certain problems might 
arise in relation to the enforcement of non-mone-
tary judgments or injunctions, which shall be en-
forced on the basis of the law of the requested State 
under the CLIP Principles. In summary, the literature 
commenting on those principles makes it clear that 
“under Article 4:703(3) CLIP Principles, all these is-
sues are left to the legislation of the enforcing coun-
try and no specific provisions have been adopted. 
Therefore, the procedural law of the enforcing coun-
try determines issues such as the following: organs 
of enforcement, including the judicial or administra-
tive nature of enforcement; modes of enforcement 
of money and non-money judgments; methods of co-
ercion (such as a levy on assets or garnishment); the 
possibility of the cumulative employment of several 
types of monetary enforcement; the relevant time 
for the conversion of the foreign currency in which 
the judgment was expressed into the domestic cur-
rency; sanctions against non-compliance with en-
forceability; the consequences of irregular enforce-
ment; and the level of intervention by the courts as 
an ultimate guarantee of legality.”301 The ALI Prin-
ciples and the Transparency Proposal lack rules on 
the point. Yet, the Transparency Proposal reaches 
the same result as the CLIP Principles and the Joint 
Korean and Japanese Proposal. In fact, the commen-
tary to the Transparency Proposal clarifies that this 
Proposal is “based on some fundamental principles 
prerequisite for Article 118 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and Article 24 of the Civil Execution Act. 
They are as follows: […] (ii) the recognition of for-
eign judgments without any special procedure, i.e. 
automatic recognition (see Art. 118 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure); and (iii) an action seeking an exe-
cution judgment for foreign judgments (Art. 24 (1) 
of the Civil Execution Act). Although [the Transpar-
ency Proposal] […] includes no provisions setting 
forth these principles, it presupposes them as a mat-
ter of course.”302 
193 Also the 2001 Hague Draft Convention provides that 
the law of the State addressed governs in this regard, 
and the Report to this Draft Convention refers to the 
automatic recognition cases, as is highlighted below 
in paragraph R.IV.
194 With respect to the recognition and enforcement of 
injunctions see also the paragraphs related to the ef-
fects of judgments (E.), to public policy (M.), and to 
severability (G.).    
II. Rationale 
195 The procedures for recognizing and enforcing a for-
eign judgment may differ, given the differences be-
tween the two judicial concepts. Professor Pedro de 
Miguel Asensio provides an explanation of their dif-
ferences in his analysis of the CLIP Principles: while 
the conditions for denying recognition or enforce-
ment of a judgment are the same, “the only addi-
tional requirement is that in order to be enforcea-
ble, a judgment must be enforceable in the state of 
origin. Although a judgment cannot be enforced un-
less it is previously recognized, recognition has sig-
nificance outside the enforcement context because 
a foreign judgment also must be recognized in or-
der to be given preclusive effect or to produce in the 
requested state its so-called dispositive effects re-
garding the creation, modification, or termination 
of a legal relationship or situation.”303 By contrast, 
“enforcement means that the courts of the destina-
tion country will take the necessary steps to give 
one party the relief granted to it by the foreign judg-
ment, having recourse to public coercive force when 
needed.”304 Finally, another distinction is to be made 
between enforcement and declaration of enforcea-
bility. In fact, “the possibility to enforce a foreign 
judgment normally requires a previous declaration 
of enforceability by the courts of the enforcing coun-
try. In particular, the grant of enforceability is typ-
ically subject in the different systems to a specific 
procedure, usually referred to as exequatur in some 
European and Latin American countries and regis-
tration in some common law countries.”305
196 According to Professor de Miguel, the differences 
with respect to the recognition and enforcement 
procedure under the CLIP Principles are in line with 
the prevailing international approach.306 As such, 
the CLIP Principles provide for “automatic recogni-
tion,” meaning that foreign judgments may be rec-
ognized without any special procedure, or more pre-
cisely, “foreign judgments may take effect ipso iure 
whenever recognition is invoked as an incidental 
question or as a main question before a competent 
authority of the recognizing country.”307  By con-
trast, the enforcement of a foreign judgment may 
be subject to special procedures.308 Article 4:703 pro-
vides that the law of the requested state determines 
the methods by which a foreign judgment can be de-
clared enforceable. The principle that the declara-
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tion of enforceability and enforcement shall be regu-
lated by the law of the requested country posed is in 
line with the international, EU and national tenden-
cies related to enforcement of foreign judgments.309 
The Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal also adopts 
this approach even though the related rules and 
comments are much simpler than the ones of the 
CLIP Principles. The Transparency Proposal does not 
encompass rules on the point, but addresses the is-
sue also in a simple way in the Commentaries, refer-
ring to the Japanese internal system. Yet, all sets of 
Principles seem to lead to the same results. 
III.  International Context
197 At the international level, the approach that the law 
of the requested court applies with respect to the 
procedures for declaration of enforceability and the 
enforcement of foreign judgments is adopted by var-
ious Conventions, as it is also emphasised by the Re-
port to Art.30 of the Hague Draft Convention, which 
adopts the same approach as will be examined in 
paragraph R.IV. At the European level, the distinc-
tion between recognition, declaration of enforcea-
bility, and enforcement of a judgment is posed by 
Art. 33 of the Brussels I Regulation and of the Lugano 
Convention. The Brussels system is based on the mu-
tual trust between member States and therefore on 
the automatic recognition of judgments rendered 
by the courts of the EU/EFTA member States. The 
characteristics of this system are well highlighted 
by the Explanatory Report to the Lugano Convention 
by Professor Pocar, who states that the rules for rec-
ognition and enforcement are intended to limit the 
intervention of the State, so that the “declaration of 
enforceability of a judgment can be reduced to little 
more than a formality.”310 Furthermore, the Explan-
atory Report establishes that member states should 
always declare a judgment from another member 
state as prima facie enforceable, without any inquiry. 
Only if a party to the proceedings challenges the dec-
laration of enforceability will the Court of the re-
quested State examine the judgment more closely, 
and the burden is on the objecting party.311 Finally, 
the Pocar Report states that, if the proper formalities 
have been complied with, Article 41 requires the re-
quested Court to declare the judgment enforceable 
“immediately.”312 In relation to the Brussels system, 
it is also notable that with regard to non-monetary 
judgments, although not specifically in the IP field, 
the ECJ in the Realchemie case clarified that the recog-
nition and enforcement rules of the Brussels system 
apply to the non-monetary judgments, and other rel-
evant decisions reached the same result with respect 
to non-monetary injunctions related to EU IPRs.313 
In the EU the recasting process of the Brussels Reg-
ulation will address the recognition and enforce-
ment procedures given by non EU/EFTA member 
States and will abolish the exequatur proceeding. 
This is said to be “one of the great achievements of 
the new text.” In connection with IP the impact of 
the exequatur’s abolishment is “especially remark-
able.” First “a permanent injunction by any Member 
State Court (however unlikely in actual practice un-
der the circumstances indicated in § 3) is automati-
cally enforceable in all other Member States without 
need for a declaration of enforceability.”314 Second, 
under Art. 49 of the Brussels Regulation, the judg-
ment rendered in a Member State that orders the 
payment by way of penalty is enforceable in a differ-
ent Member State but only if and to the extent such a 
payment has been finally determined by the Court of 
the rendered Member State. This has been criticized 
in the following way: “if the permanent injunction 
issued by the Court of the Member State of origin is 
not respected in a different Member State, the right 
holder has to go back and forth between Courts sev-
eral times before he sees the money. If I get it right, 
non compliance with the permanent injunction in 
the Member State of enforcement must be proved 
to the satisfaction of the Court of the same; an ap-
plication for the ‘final determination’ has then to be 
submitted to the Court of the Member State of or-
igin; finally the determination of this latter Court 
has to be brought back to the Court of the Member 
State of enforcement, to obtain the exequatur and 
finally to be enforced.” 315 However, with the Draft 
Proposal “these four separate steps are folded into 
one just by combining Art. 38(2) and 67,” and this is 
defined as a true “achievement.” 316
198 At the national level the distinction between recogni-
tion, declaration of enforceability, and enforcement 
of a judgment is posed by Art. 118 of the Japanese 
Code of Civil Procedure (recognition) in connection 
with Art. 24 of the Japanese Civil Execution Act (dec-
laration of enforceability)317 and by other rules such 
as Arts. 64-67 of the Italian PIL Statute. 
IV.  Discussion
199 The CLIP Principles, the Transparency Proposal (ac-
cording to their commentary) and the Joint Korean 
and Japanese Proposal lead to the same result of 
making the requested court apply its law to the rec-
ognition, enforcement, and declaration of enforce-
ability issues. Furthermore, the CLIP Principles and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal approach are 
in line with Art. 30 of the Hague Draft Convention. It 
is emphasised also by the Report to this Draft Con-
vention, according to which, “the renvoi to national 
law corresponds to the current practice of interna-
tional Conventions on enforcement of judgments, 
and was unhesitatingly adopted by the Special Com-
mission, which felt it would be difficult to devise a 
simplified uniform procedure for obtaining a decla-
ration of enforceability in a worldwide Convention. 
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The only common indicator is the requirement for 
the court addressed to act expeditiously,”318 as was 
discussed at paragraph Q. 
200 Furthermore, the same Art. 30 of this Hague Draft 
Convention adopts the distinction among “recog-
nition, declaration of enforceability […] and the en-
forcement of the judgment,” and the Report to this 
rule acknowledges the possibility of establishing 
a system of automatic recognition by stating that 
“where no procedure is required for the recognition 
of foreign judgments, it may take place automati-
cally without intervention by a judicial or other au-
thority.”319 However, the academic projects consid-
ered do not include a rule such as the one inserted in 
Art. 30 of the Hague Draft Convention according to 
which, “[The law of the State addressed must provide 
for the possibility to appeal against the declaration 
of enforceability or registration for enforcement].” 
201 Finally, it is regrettable that the ALI Principles do not 
provide for similar rules. The absence of a clear rule 
in this respect in the Transparency Proposal could 
be an issue for those who might not be aware of its 
relevant commentary recalling the Japanese internal 
rules on the recognition and enforcement at stake 
as a general grounding principle of the Proposal.320
S. Settlements
I. Differences 
202 The ALI Principles, the Transparency Proposal and 
the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal lack rules on 
the point. In addition, the commentary to the Trans-
parency Proposal makes it clear that “the Transpar-
ency proposal does not […] allow for the recogni-
tion and enforcement of settlements.” In contrast, 
the CLIP Principles explicitly specify that the term 
“judgment” also encompasses settlements to which a 
court has given its authority. The approach taken by 
the CLIP Principles is supported by the 2001 Hague 
Draft Convention, as is outlined below in paragraph 
S.IV.
II.  Rationale 
203 The rationale of allowing the recognition and en-
forcement of judicial settlements is the willingness 
to favor solving international disputes by agree-
ment. This provision is in line with the Hague Draft 
Convention and other similar rules at the interna-
tional and EU level. In contrast, the commentary 
to the Transparency Proposal adopts the view that 
such an approach is “quite liberal and may poten-
tially be abused.”321 Yet, the same commentary does 
not exclude that in the future, recognition and en-
forcement of settlements could be established un-
der the Transparency Proposal as well, even though 
it is necessary “to think about how such abuse can 
be avoided.”322
III.  International Context
204 At the international level, Article 2 of The Hague 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
of 1971 as well as Art. 12 of The Hague Convention 
on Choice of Court Agreements of 2005 can be men-
tioned among the provisions on the recognition and 
enforcement of judicial settlements.323 Also, Article 
36 of the Hague Draft Convention includes a defini-
tion of settlements,324 as will be referred to in par-
agraph S.IV. 
205 At the EU level, Art. 58 of the Brussels I Regulation325 
and of the Lugano Convention of 2007, and Art. 2.d 
of the Draft Proposal for a Recasting of the Brussels 
I Regulation can be mentioned among the provisions 
on the recognition and enforcement of judicial set-
tlements.. Particularly, the Pocar Report to the Lu-
gano Convention makes references to its “pream-
ble [which] states that the aim of the Convention 
is to strengthen in the territories of the contract-
ing parties the legal protection of persons therein 
established, and for this purpose to determine the 
international jurisdiction of the courts, to facilitate 
the recognition of judgments, authentic instruments 
and court settlements, and to introduce an expedi-
tious procedure for securing their enforcement.”326
IV.  Discussion
206 Because the facilitation of cross-border enforcement 
of judicial settlements can favor their potentiality to 
solve international disputes by agreement also in the 
context of cross-border litigation on IPRs, it may be 
regrettable that the ALI Principles, the Transparency 
Proposal and the Joint Korean and Japanese Proposal 
lack rules on the recognition and enforcement of set-
tlements. In contrast, such a rule is present in the 
CLIP Principles and even though it is criticized by 
the commentary to the Transparency Proposal as 
being too liberal and therefore subject to potential 
abuses,327 the CLIP Principles’ relevant rule is in line 
with the recognition and enforcement of “in-court 
settlements”328 established by Art. 36 of the Hague 
Draft Convention and other similar norms at the in-
ternational and EU level. 
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T. Conclusions
207  The comparison just exposed demonstrates that in 
practice, all four sets of Principles lead to similar re-
sults allowing for the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments defined in a broad and flexible way, 
inclusive of non-final judgments, as well as of pro-
visional measures. This similarity among the prin-
ciples at stake is grounded on the great need, par-
ticularly in connection with IPRs, for the effective 
protection of a rights holder from an infringement, 
and is a natural consequence of the favor shown to-
wards the consolidation of claims provided for by all 
four sets of Principles. Thus, such need grounds, for 
instance, the understanding by all four sets of Prin-
ciples of the public policy exception as a last resort 
mechanism to deny recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments; the favor by the same princi-
ples for the (partial) recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments imposing punitive damages; and 
the approach adopted by all sets of Principles favor-
ing the recognition and enforcement of foreign de-
cisions in disputes in which not only the infringe-
ment of rights registered in countries other than 
the adjudicating country is addressed, or the first 
entitlement and ownership of the same right, but 
also when their validity or registration is raised in-
cidentally and sometimes even principally (ALI Prin-
ciples, Transparency Proposal). They do limit, how-
ever, the validity of the effects of the recognition 
and enforcement of the decisions to the parties of 
the proceeding. 
208  In light of these conclusions, the comparison ex-
plains that despite certain minor differences among 
the rules on recognition and enforcement of the four 
sets of academic Principles, in the majority of cases, 
further studies and the work of the ILA Commit-
tee could help in overcoming these differences and 
achieving common results which could eventually 
be codified in a future ILA Resolution.
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